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“I am not merely seeking an ‘outcome’ since human beings prefer to find shortcuts to
that outcome. Once I am on that shortcut, probably I will miss the truth I am seeking
as well as my passion for the truth. The critical thing is the will to seek the truth, even
if I fail this time, as long as the will exists, I will find the truth someday because I will
always keep going.”
Leone Abbacchio
Abstract
The widespread use of smartphones and camera-coupled Internet of Thing (IoT) devices
triggers an explosive growth of imagery data. To extract and process the rich contents
contained in imagery data, various image analysis techniques have been investigated and
applied to a spectrum of application scenarios. In recent years, breakthroughs in deep
learning have powered a new revolution for image analysis in terms of effectiveness with
high resource consumption. Given the fact that most smartphones and IoT devices have
limited computational capability and battery life, they are not ready for the processing
of computational intensive analytics over imagery data collected by them, especially
when deep learning is involved. To resolve the bottleneck of computation, storage,
and energy for these resource constrained devices, offloading complex image analysis to
public cloud computing platforms has become a promising trend in both academia and
industry. However, an outstanding challenge with public cloud is on the protection of
sensitive information contained in many imagery data, such as personal identities and
financial data. Directly sending imagery data to the public cloud can cause serious
privacy concerns and even legal issues.
In this dissertation, I propose a comprehensive privacy-preserving imagery data analysis
framework which can be integrated in different application scenarios to assist image anal-
ysis for resource-constrained devices with efficiency, accuracy, and privacy protection.
I first identify security challenges in the utilization of public cloud for image analysis.
Then, I design and develop a set of novel solutions to address these challenges. These
solutions will be featured by strong privacy guarantee, lightweight computation, low ac-
curacy loss compared with image analysis without privacy protection. To optimize the
communication overhead and resource utilization of using cloud computing, I investigate
edge computing, which is a promising technique to ameliorate the high communication
overhead in cloud-assisted architectures. Furthermore, to boost the performance of my
solutions under both cloud and edge deployment, I also provide a set of pluggable en-
hancement modules to be applied to meet different requirements for various tasks. By
exploring the features of edge computing and cloud computing, I flexibly incorporate
them as a comprehensive framework to provide privacy-preserving image analysis ser-
vices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
From the first digital picture was taken, various research efforts have been spent on image
analysis, since imagery data contain a great amount of rich information. Image analysis
techniques have been adopted in a spectrum of scenarios, including classification [1–5],
annotation [6–8], segmentation [9–12], object detection [13–16], etc. These techniques
greatly fulfill the semantic gap between low level image pixels and high level human
perceivable concepts.
Meanwhile, the widespread use of smartphones brings the explosive growth in the number
of pictures taken. Forever’s Strategy & Business Development team [17] has pointed out
that the number of photos taken by smartphone is estimated to be 8.8 trillion in 2018.
Alongside the thriving mobile computing and Internet of Things (IoTs), the demands of
effective image analysis have become stronger ever. To perform effective imagery data
analysis, there are two major types of approaches: Descriptor Based Approach and Deep
Learning Based Approach.
1
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• Descriptor Based Approach: In the descriptor based image analysis, a set of fea-
tures (also known as local descriptors), such as color space features and texture
features, will be extracted from images. These features describe images from differ-
ent perspectives, and can be further analyzed to extract information from images
using different algorithms. The descriptor based image analysis has been widely
adopted in computer vision tasks such as image classification [18, 19], annotation
[6–8], object detection [20, 21] etc. For general image analysis without complex
models and subsequent training, a set of global low-level image features including
RGB, HSV, LAB, Gabor and Haar are chosen as the baseline image annotation
technique [22]. Efficiency enhancement and privacy protection modules for these
descriptors will be introduced in Chapter 3.
• Deep Learning Based Approach: Unlike the descriptor based approaches that re-
quire a specific descriptor, the deep learning [23] based approaches train artificial
neural networks (ANNs) to automatically select features for specific image analysis
tasks. One of the most commonly used artificial neural networks is convolutional
neural network (CNN). Compared with descriptor based approaches, CNN based
deep learning models has significantly enhanced the effectiveness in many image
analysis application scenarios, including image classification [1–5], object detection
[13–16], face recognition [24, 25, 25, 26] etc.
1.2 Challenges
While these approaches provide decent functionalities for image analysis, they are re-
source consuming for complex tasks, especially when being executed on resource-
constrained mobile and IoT devices. In the descriptor based approaches, large-scale
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datasets are required to ensure the accuracy of image analysis tasks, such as object
recognition, image annotation, etc. The involvement of these large-scale datasets in-
evitably cause high computation and storage cost to fulfill the tasks. In deep learning
based approaches, a request image needs to go through each layer of a deep neural net-
work to complete the inference process. In prevailing CNN based deep architectures such
as VGG [3] and ResNet [5], the analysis of an image costs billions of float operations
(FLOPs). In addition, in these deep architectures, fully connected layers need to store
millions of parameters, and thus resulting a considerable storage overhead.
Not only the image analysis task can bring huge burden to mobile and IoT devices,
images per se can yield storage problem to these devices. On-board storage for mobile
and IoT devices becomes limited as the image resolution grows higher. To facilitate
the long-term storage and image analysis task of high-volume photos taken everyday,
majority of smartphones today are synchronizing their photo albums with cloud storage,
such as Apple’s iCloud, Samsung Cloud, and Google Photos. Besides the storage service,
these cloud storage platforms also help analyze and provide a few decent features helping
their users organize their photos. An example is that a large portion of cloud service
providers annotate users’ photos with proper keywords, which is the key enabler for
users to perform popular keyword based search and organization over their photos. In
fact, offloading complex image analysis tasks to public cloud platforms has become a
prevailing trend for resource-constrained devices [27, 28]. Public cloud service not only
offers sufficient computation and storage resources to guarantee the efficiency of image
analysis and storage services, but also provides a higher portability for the deployment
of services.
Despite these decent features brought by public cloud service, it also raises privacy con-
cerns. One outstanding challenge with public cloud, however, is on the protection of
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sensitive information involved in images while offloading the analysis tasks. As a matter
of fact, many images are sensitive by nature and contain various sensitive information,
such as financial information, personal identities/locations, and healthcare information
[29]. Directly sending images to public clouds can raise not only privacy concerns, but
also legal issues [30]. To protect the privacy of photos, encrypting them with stan-
dard encryption algorithms, e.g., AES, is still the major approach for privacy protection
in cloud storage [31, 32]. However, this kind of encryption also sacrifices many other
attractive functionalities of cloud storage, especially for keyword based search and man-
agement for imagery files. How to protect the privacy of imagery data while utilizing
the fancy features brought by public cloud services becomes an open challenge.
Targeted at privacy-preserving image analysis in public cloud, existing researches have
spent a significant amount of efforts to design solutions for descriptor based image anal-
ysis [33–35] and deep learning based image analysis [36–44] respectively. While these
solutions achieve various functionality of image analysis on public cloud in a privacy-
preserving manner, expensive cryptographic primitives utilized in them (e.g., homomor-
phic encryption and multi-party secure computation) introduce heavy encryption and
communication overhead to mobile and IoT devices. As a result, their efficiency is
restricted for complex tasks due to the intensive computation cost. Specifically, such
a performance limitation makes these solutions far away from practical in support of
time-sensitive deep learning inference tasks on IoT devices. For example, a quad-core
Raspberry Pi, which outperforms most resource-constrained IoT devices in terms of
computational capability, can perform only four Paillier homomorphic encryption per
second [45]. Given a single input of a typical deep learning model, AlexNet [46], which
has 227× 227× 3 elements, it requires more than 10 hours to complete the encryption,
which is impractical for most applications in terms of time efficiency. Moreover, some
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
existing schemes, e.g. CryptoNets [47], utilize approximation to meet security require-
ment of homomorphic encryption and thus introducing an accuracy loss to the image
analysis task.
In additional to the challenge of balancing privacy and computation costs in utilizing
public cloud, another challenge is how to reduce the communication overhead during
imagery data processing, especially for devices that requires real-time data analytics.
Taking cloud-assisted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as an example, the real-time
transmission of high-definition images or full-motion video (FMV) from UAVs to cloud
is bandwidth demanding. This kind of bandwidth demanding constant transmission can
quickly drain the battery life of UAVs. Moreover, high network latency is also intro-
duced, which limits their applications in time-sensitive tasks that require fast-response
for imagery data analysis, such as disaster detection and search-and-rescue. Motivated
by such a fact, recent research introduced “edge-computing” to ameliorate the commu-
nication cost when utilizing cloud-assisted architecture [48]. By deploying edge comput-
ing resources that are close to devices, initial data processing tasks can be carried out,
and only critical information will be transmitted to the cloud. As a result, the “data
drowning” issue that causes high network latency can be mitigated in cloud-assisted ar-
chitectures. Nevertheless, existing researches either do not consider privacy issues when
using edge devices, or place full trust on them. There still lacks research efforts to ad-
dress privacy concerns when third-party edge computing resources is utilized, which is
analogous to the use of public cloud. As a matter of fact, mobile-edge computing (MEC)
[49] provided by third-party base station is one of the most important edge-computing
resources. This is because MEC can easily offer one-hop communication for most mo-
bile and IoT devices, and can host sufficient computational resources for required data
processing.
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1.3 Contributions
In order to address the aforementioned challenges and develop a generic methodology
for imagery data analysis under different scenarios, three rubrics, efficiency, accuracy, as
well as privacy need to be taken into consideration at the same time. I made my contri-
butions by figuring out a perfect balance among these three rubrics. Due to the nature
of some deployment environment (e.g. resource-constrained IoT devices), I also evaluate
other rubrics such as storage cost and energy consumption. In this dissertation, I design
a few expendable modules to be plugged in to meet different requirements in various
situations. With the knowledge that imagery data analysis tasks could be deployed in
cloud/edge environments using either descriptor/deep learning based approaches, I ap-
ply these modules and investigate their performance in the following research directions.
Specifically, I make my contribution by demonstrating the practical use and performance
of my modules in these directions.
• Direction 1: Cloud-assisted Privacy-preserving Descriptor Based Image Analysis.
Regarding the direction of descriptor based image analysis, I use one of the most
important image analysis tasks, i.e., automatic image annotation as an applica-
tion scenario to mys privacy-preserving solution for descriptor based image anal-
ysis. Image annotation techniques extract appropriate keywords for an image,
which serve as the fundamental part for in-depth image analysis, e.g., object de-
tection and search in images, similarity measurement of images, etc. My privacy-
preserving solution enables offloading complex automatic image annotation tasks
to public cloud, which will be featured by high efficiency, strong privacy protec-
tion, and low accuracy loss. Efficient data structures and indexing techniques are
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
also explored to further improve the efficiency of privacy-preserving computation.
The results of this research direction are presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
• Direction 2: Edge-assisted Privacy-preserving Deep Learning Based Image Analy-
sis. In order to provide a privacy-preserving solution in the deep learning based
image analysis direction, I tailor and deploy CNN models on edge devices to pri-
vately assist real-time image analysis on resource-constrained IoT devices. I mainly
focus on the inference stage of deep learning analysis, which directly fits real-time
imagery data analysis nature for most IoT devices. In this task, I first seek to
identify computational and storage intensive layers in the CNN based deep learn-
ing. Then, efficient privacy-preserving offloading schemes will be developed for
these layers to support image analysis. Privacy protection modules are designed
independently for each type of CNN layers, which enables their flexible integration
to support different image analysis tasks relied on various CNN structures. The
research results of this task are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
1.4 Roadmap
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 defines the overall problem formulation, high level system model and
threat model.
• Chapter 3 presents my research results of a cloud-assisted privacy-preserving im-
age annotation scheme as demonstration of my privacy-preserving modules for
descriptor based image analysis.
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• Chapter 4 analyzes the security of privacy-preserving distance comparison modules
under cloud-assisted scenarios presented in Chapter 3 and evaluates their practical
performance.
• Chapter 5 states my research results of an edge-assisted offloading scheme of deep
learning models as demonstration of my privacy-preserving modules for deep learn-
ing based image analysis.
• Chapter 6 first discusses the security of edge-assisted privacy-preserving compute-
intense layer modules presented in Chapter 5 and then evaluates their practical
performance.
• Chapter 7 illustrates future research directions and provides a conclusion for this
dissertation.
Chapter 2
Problem Formulation
In order to dive deep into the two research directions mentioned in the end of last chapter,
I formulate the underlying problems and define corresponding system and threat model
for each direction.
2.1 Cloud-assisted Privacy-preserving Descriptor Based Im-
age Analysis
2.1.1 System Model
In the direction of cloud-assisted descriptor based image analysis, I consider two entities:
a Cloud Server and a User. The user stores his/her images on cloud, and then, based
on the extracted and processed image descriptors, the cloud helps the user to analyze
his/her images without learning the contents of images. In this scenario, the user first
performs a one-time system setup that prepares an encrypted large scale dataset, which
is offloaded to the cloud server to assist future privacy-preserving image analysis. Later
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on, when the user has a new image to be analyzed, he/she generates an encrypted
request and sends it to the cloud. After processing the encrypted request, the cloud
returns ciphertexts of analysis results and auxiliary information to the user. Finally, the
user decrypts all the data returned from the cloud, and based on the decrypted data,
the user is able to generate the final analysis result for the requested image.
2.1.2 Threat Model
In this cloud-assisted descriptor based image analysis scenario, I consider the cloud
server to be “curious-but-honest”, i.e., the cloud server will follow a designated scheme
to perform storage and image analysis services correctly, but it may try to learn sen-
sitive information in user’s data. The cloud server has access to all encrypted images,
encrypted descriptors, encrypted auxiliary information, the user’s encrypted requests,
and encrypted analysis results. I also assume the user’s devices are fully trusted and
will not be compromised. The research on protecting user devices is orthogonal to this
research direction. These assumptions are consistent with major research works that
focus on search over encrypted data on public cloud [50–52]. This scenario model fo-
cuses on preventing the cloud server from learning following information: 1) contents of
the user’s images; 2) extracted descriptors and analysis result for each image; 3) request
linkability, i.e., tell whether multiple analysis requests are from the same image.
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2.2 Edge-assisted Privacy-preserving Deep Learning Based
Image Analysis
2.2.1 System Model
For the research direction of privacy-preserving deep learning based image analysis, in
my setting, there are two entities: IoT Device and Edge Computing Device. The IoT
device collects imagery data and needs to utilize CNN inference over the imagery data
to get analysis result. The edge device obtains a trained CNN model and contributes its
computing capability to the CNN imagery data inference task. There are two scenarios
for the offloading of CNN inference according to the provider of the trained model:
(1) the data holder deploys its own trained model on a computing service platform
and later on submits data for inference tasks [36]; (2) the computing service platform
offers the trained model and performs inference on data submitted by the data holder,
which is known as “machine learning as a service” [41–44]. When privacy is taken into
consideration, both scenarios require the protection of imagery data and inference results
against the computing service platform, and the second scenario also needs to prevent
the data holder from learning the trained model.
In this dissertation, I focus on the first scenario. To be specific, I wish to design a scheme
that the IoT device and edge device engage in, at the end of which the IoT device obtains
the CNN inference result over its image analysis request, whereas the edge device only
assists the computation without learning the details of the image as well as the analysis
result.
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2.2.2 Threat Model
Similar as the setting of last research direction, I consider the edge device to be “curious-
but-honest”, i.e., the edge device adheres to the protocol that describes the computation,
communication, and storage tasks, but attempts to infer information about the image
input and output of the IoT device’s CNN inference task. Given a CNN based image
analysis inference task, the edge device has access to the trained CNN model (offloaded
convolutional layers and fully-connected layers only) as well as the encrypted image
analysis request and the outputs of all offloaded layers. The IoT device is considered to
be fully trusted and will not be compromised.
I aim at preventing the edge device from learning the IoT devices’ inputs and outputs
of each offloaded layer. The overall purpose of the inference task is not going to be
protected, since the CNN model is known to the edge device. For example, the edge
device knows the CNN inference is used for object detection, but shall not learn the input
image data and the corresponding detection result. I assume that the CNN model is
trained by IoT device owner with data in the clear. To prevent privacy leakage of training
data from the CNN model, a statistical database can be used for training as discussed in
the differential privacy literature [53, 54]. The research on privacy-preserving training
is orthogonal to this work.
Chapter 3
Privacy Protection for Descriptor
Based Image Analysis
To sail in the first research direction regarding privacy-preserving descriptor based image
analysis, I use one of the most important image analysis tasks, i.e., automatic image
annotation in a cloud involved environment as an application. In this application, the
user offloads his/her image to the cloud to get annotated with a set of keywords. My
application scenario and problem formulation is the same as in the corresponding section
of Chapter 2, in which the cloud follows the designated algorithm to assist the annotation
but is curious about the content of the user uploaded image.
3.1 Introduction
Automatic image annotation has been an important and challenging task in computer
vision area. One of the critical contributions of image annotation is to establish a se-
mantic link between imagery data and textual description so that such applications
13
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as keyword-based image search on public cloud can become possible. In order to en-
able keyword-based search and management on encrypted data in cloud, keyword-based
searchable encryption (SE) has been widely investigated in recent years [50–52, 55, 56].
An SE scheme typically provides encrypted search indexes constructed based on proper
keywords assigned to data files. With these encrypted indexes, the data owner can
submit encrypted keyword-based search request to search their data over ciphertexts.
Unfortunately, these SE schemes all assume that keywords are already available for files
to be processed, which is hard to be true for photos taken by smartphones. Specifically,
unlike text files that support automatic keyword extraction from their contents, key-
words assignment for imagery files relies on manual description or automatic annotation
based on a large-scale pre-annotated image dataset. From the perspective of user ex-
perience, manually annotating each image from users’ devices is clearly an impractical
choice. Meanwhile, automatic image annotation that involves large-scale image datasets
is too resource-consuming to be developed on smartphones. Although currently several
cloud storage platforms offer image annotation services [57, 58], these platforms require
access to unencrypted images. Therefore, how to provide efficient and privacy-preserving
automatic annotation for smartphones’ photos becomes the foundation of SE schemes
applications on smartphones.
To address this problem, I introduce a cloud-assisted privacy-preserving image an-
notation scheme (CAPIA). By tailoring homomorphic encryption over vector space,
I first design two privacy-preserving outsourcing schemes for L1 distance comparison
and Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence comparison respectively as building modules for
CAPIA. As a result, CAPIA is able to offload the image annotation process to the public
cloud in privacy-preserving manner. In addition, thanks to the underlying linear oper-
ations, CAPIA can be easily parallelized for cloud computing environment. Meanwhile,
Chapter 3. Privacy Protection for Descriptor Based Image Analysis 15
CAPIA achieves comparable annotation accuracy compared with existing no-privacy-
preserving image annotation approaches. Furthermore, as the same keyword may have
different importance for the semantic description of different images, I design a real-time
weight to support accurate final keywords selection in the image annotation process.
To turbocharge CAPIA’s annotation efficiency with privacy protected, I further design
a novel privacy-preserving randomized k-d forest structure for cloud assisted annotation
(CPAR). I first combine operations for image annotation with the data search using
randomized k-d forest [59]. Then, by proposing a set of privacy-preserving comparison
schemes, my scheme enables the cloud server to perform image annotation directly over
an encrypted randomized k-d forest structure. Compared with CAPIA, CPAR offers
an adjustable speedup rate from 4× to 43.1× while achieving 97.7% to 80.3% accuracy
of CAPIA. Note that besides imagery data analysis, my privacy-preserving randomized
k-d forest design can also be used as independent tools for other related fields, especially
for these requiring similarity measurement on encrypted data.
3.2 Related Works
To automate the keywords extraction process for images, a number of research works
have been proposed with the concept of “automatic image annotation” [22, 60–62].
Chapelle et al. [63] trained support vector machine (SVM) classifiers to achieve high
annotation accuracy where the only available image features are high dimensional his-
tograms. In ref [64, 65], SVM was used to learn regional information as well as helped
segmentation and classification process simultaneously. Different from SVM which works
by finding a hyperplane to separate vector spaces, Bayesian network accomplishes the
annotation tasks by modeling the conditional probabilities from training samples. In
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ref [66, 67], Bayesian networks were built by clustering global image features to calcu-
late the conditional probabilities. However, all of these image annotation works raise
privacy issues when delegated to the cloud since unencrypted images need to be out-
sourced. Therefore, to address such privacy concerns, I propose CPAR, which utilizes
the power of cloud computing to perform automatic image annotation for users, while
only providing encrypted image information to the cloud.
As a follow-up issue of automatic image annotation, in order to solve the problem of
how to search over encrypted data, the idea of keyword-based searchable encryption
(SE) was first introduced by Song et.al in ref [55]. Later on, with the widespread use
of cloud storage services, the idea of SE received increasing attention from researchers.
In ref [50, 56], search efficiency enhanced SE schemes are proposed based on novel
index constructions. After that, SE schemes with the support of multiple keywords
and conjunctive keywords are investigated in ref [51], and thus making the search more
accurate and flexible. Recently, fuzzy keyword is considered in ref [52], which enables
SE schemes to tolerate misspelled keyword during the search process. While these SE
schemes offer decent features for keyword-based search, their application to images are
limited given the question that how keywords of images can be efficiently extracted with
privacy protection. It is impractical for cloud storage users to manually annotate their
images.
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3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Image Descriptor Extraction
According to [22], a common baseline image analysis method is based on Global low-
level image features including RGB, HSV, LAB, Gabor and HAAR because they can
be applied to general image analysis without complex models and subsequent training.
In particular, RGB feature is computed as a normalized 3D histogram of RGB pixel,
in which each channel (R,G,B) has 16 bins that divide the color space values from 0 to
255. The HSV and LAB features can be processed similarly as RGB, and thus I can
construct three feature vectors for RGB, HSV and LAB respectively as VRGB, VHSV ,
and VLAB. Texture features of an image are extracted using Gabor and Haar wavelets.
Specifically, an image is first filtered with Gabor wavelets at three scales and four ori-
entations, resulting in twelve response images. Each response image is then divided
into non-overlapping rectangle blocks. Finally, mean filter response magnitudes from
each block over all response images are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as
VG. Meanwhile, a quantized Gabor feature of an image is generated using the mean
Gabor response phase angle in non-overlapping blocks in each response image. These
quantized values are concatenated into a feature vector, denoted as VGQ. The Haar
feature of an image is extracted similarly as Gabor, but based on differently config-
ured Haar wavelets. HaarQ stands for the quantized version of Haar feature, which
quantizes Haar features into [0,-1,1] if the signs of Haar response values are zero, nega-
tive, and positive respectively. I denote feature vectors of Haar and HaarQ as VH and
VHQ respectively. Therefore, given an image, seven feature vectors will be extracted as
[VRGB,VHSV ,VLAB,VG,VGQ,VH ,VHQ]. For more details about the adopted image
feature extraction, please refer to ref [22].
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3.3.2 Integer Vector Encryption (IVE)
In this section, I describe a homomorphic encryption scheme designed for integer vec-
tors [68], which will be tailored in my construction to achieve privacy-preserving image
annotation. For expression simplicity, following definitions will be used in the rest of
this chapter:
• For a vector V (or a matrix M), define |max(V)| (or |max(M)|) to be the maxi-
mum absolute value of its elements.
• For a ∈ R, define dac to be the nearest integer of a, dacq to be the nearest integer
of a with modulus q.
• For matrix M ∈ Rn×m, define vec(M) to be a nm-dimensional vector by concate-
nating the transpose of each column of M.
Encryption: Given a m-dimensional vector V ∈ Zmp and the secret key matrix S ∈
Zm×mq , output the ciphertext of V as
C(V) = S−1(wV + e)T (3.1)
where S−1 is the inverse matrix of S, T is the transpose operator, e is a random error
vector, w is an integer parameter, q >> p, w > 2|max(e)|.
Decryption: Given the ciphertext C(V), it can be decrypted using S and w as V =
d (SC(V))
T
w cq.
Inner Product: Given two ciphertexts C(V1),C(V2) of V1,V2, and their correspond-
ing secret keys S1 and S2, the inner product operation of V1 and V2 over ciphertexts
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can be performed as
vec(ST1 S2)d
vec(C(V1)C(V2)
T )
w
cq = wV1VT2 + e (3.2)
To this end, vec(ST1 S2) becomes the new secret key and d
vec(C(V1)C(V2)T )
w cq becomes
the new ciphertext of V1V
T
2 .
More details about this IVE encryption algorithm and its security proof are available in
ref [68].
3.4 Privacy-preserving Distance Comparison
3.4.1 Image Similarity Measurement
In CAPIA, similarity of images is measured by seven low-level color and texture fea-
ture vectors [Vi,RGB,Vi,HSV ,Vi,LAB,Vi,G,Vi,GQ,Vi,H ,Vi,HQ]. Specifically, given two
images Ia,Ib, their similarity can be computed as a combined distance
Disab =DL1
RGB
ab +DL1
HSV
ab +DL1
G
ab +DL1
GQ
ab
+DL1Hab +DL1
HQ
ab +DKL
LAB
ab
where DL1 and DKL denote L1 distance and KL-Divergence of two vectors after
data normalization. I consider these seven basic distances contribute equally to the
total combined distance Disab. Based on this observation, I first propose two privacy-
preserving distance comparison solutions for L1 (namely, PL1C ) and KL-Divergence
(namely, PKLC ) respectively, which support two key operations in CAPIA.
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3.4.2 PL1C: Privacy-preserving L1 Distance Comparison
In PL1C, I consider a user has three m-dimensional integer vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c} that
will be outsourced to cloud after encryption. The cloud later compares L1 distances
DL1ac and DL1bc directly over ciphertexts to figure out which one is smaller.
Data Preparation: Given a vector Vi = [vi1, · · · , vim], i ∈ {a, b, c}, the user converts
it to a mβ-dimensional binary vector Ṽi = [F (vi1), · · · , F (vim)], where β = |max(Vi)|,
and F (vij) = [1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0] such that the first vij terms are 1 and the rest β− vij
terms are 0. The L1 distance between Va and Vb now can be calculated as
DL1ab =
∑m
j=1 |vaj − vbj | =
∑mβ
j=1(ṽaj − ṽbj)2
Then, the user adopts an approximation method introduced in ref [69] to reduce the
dimension of Ṽi from mβ to m̂ = αm log
β+1
γ based on the Johnson Lindenstrauss (JL)
Lemma [70]. By denoting the approximated vector as V̂i, I have DL1ab =
∑mβ
j=1(ṽaj −
ṽbj)
2 ≈
∑m̂
j=1(v̂aj − v̂bj)2.
The correctness and accuracy of such an approximation have been proved in ref [69].
According to my experimental evaluation in Section 6.2, I set α = 1 and γ = 100 in my
scheme to achieve balanced accuracy and efficiency.
Data Encryption: Given an approximated vector V̂i, i ∈ {a, b}, the user appends two
elements to it as V̂i = [v̂i1, v̂i2, · · · , v̂im̂, r− 12
∑m̂
j=1 v̂
2
ij , εi], where r is a random number
and εi is a small random noise. Then, the user encrypts V̂i using the Encryption
algorithm of IVE presented in Section 3.3.2 as
Ci = S
−1(wV̂i + ei)
T (3.3)
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where S is the secret matrix, ei is an error vector, and w is an integer parameter. Ca,
Cb, and w are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation: Given the approximated vector V̂c, the user selects a positive
random number rc and applies it to V̂c as V̂c = [rcv̂c1, · · · , rcv̂cm̂, rc, 1]. V̂c is then
encrypted as Cc = S
−1
c (wV̂c + ec)
T , where Sc is the secret key generated for V̂c. Cc
and STSc are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison: On receiving the request, the cloud computes dvec(CaC
T
c )
w cq,
dvec(CbC
T
c )
w cq, and decrypts them using vec(S
TSc) to obtain V̂aV̂
T
c and V̂bV̂
T
c as Eq.3.2.
Finally, the approximated L1 distance comparison is performed as
V̂bV̂
T
c − V̂aV̂
T
c (3.4)
= rc
m̂∑
j=1
v̂bj v̂cj −
rc
2
m̂∑
j=1
v̂2bj + rcr + εb
− (rc
m̂∑
j=1
v̂aj v̂cj −
rc
2
m̂∑
j=1
v̂2aj + rcr + εa)
=
rc
2
(
m̂∑
j=1
(v̂aj − v̂cj)2 −
m̂∑
j=1
(v̂bj − v̂cj)2) + (εb − εa)
≈ rc
2
(DL1ac −DL1bc) + (εb − εa)
It is worth to note that PL1C is only interested in which distance is smaller during
the comparison. Therefore, instead of letting the cloud get exact L1 distances for com-
parison, PL1C adopts approximated distance comparison result scaled and obfuscated
by rc and εb − εa as shown in Eq.3.4. As rc is a positive random number, the sign of
rc
2 (DL1ac −DL1bc) is consistent with DL1ac −DL1bc. Meanwhile, since rc >> εb − εa,
the added noise term has negligible influence to the sign of DL1ac−DL1bc unless these
two distances are very close to each other. Fortunately, instead of finding the most
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related one, my CAPIA design will utilize PL1C to figure out top 10 related candidates
during the comparison. Such a design makes important candidates (say top 5 out of
top 10) not be bypassed by the error introduced in εb − εa. This hypothesis is further
validated by my experimental results in Section 6.2.
3.4.3 PKLC: Privacy-preserving KL-Divergence Comparison
In PKLC, I consider a user has three m-dimensional vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}, and wants
to outsource the comparison of DKLac and DKLbc to the cloud without disclosing the
content of Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}. The definition of KL-Divergence for two vectors Va, Vb is:
DKLab =
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(
vaj
vbj
) (3.5)
=
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vaj)−
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vbj)
where log(
vaj
vbj
) = log(vaj) = log(vbj) = 0 if vaj = 0 or vbj = 0.
Data Encryption: The user first appends m + 2 elements to Vi, i ∈ {a, b} as Vi =
[vi1, vi2, · · · , vim, vi1×log(vi1), · · · , vim×log(vim), r, εi], where r is a random number and
εi is a small random noise. Then, Vi, i ∈ {a, b} are encrypted with the Encryption
algorithm of IVE as
Ci = S
−1(wVi + ei)
T (3.6)
Ca and Cb are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation: The user processes Vc to generate a privacy-preserving KL-
Divergence comparison request as
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• Replace elements vcj with −rc×log(vcj), and append m+2 elements to Vc as Vc =
[−rc × log(vc1), · · · ,−rc × log(vcm), F (vc1), · · · , F (vcm), rc,−1], where F (vcj) ={
rc, vcj 6= 0
0, vcj = 0
, rc is a positive random number changing for every request.
• Encrypt Vc as Cc using the Encryption algorithm of IVE as Cc = S−1c (wVc +
ec)
T .
Cc and S
TSc are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison: On receiving the request, the cloud first computes dvec(CaC
T
c )
w cq,
dvec(CbC
T
c )
w cq and decrypts them using vec(S
TSc) to get VaV
T
c and VbV
T
c as Eq.3.2.
Then, the cloud compares DKLac and DKLbc by computing
VaV
T
c −VbVTc (3.7)
= rc(r +
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vaj)−
m∑
j=1
vaj × log(vcj))− εa
− rc(r +
m∑
j=1
vbj × log(vbj)−
m∑
j=1
vbj × log(vcj)) + εb
= rc(DKLac −DKLbc) + (εb − εa)
Similar to my PL1C construction, I have rc > 0 and rc >> (εb − εa). Therefore, the
cloud can figure out which KL-Divergence is smaller based on the scaled and obfuscated
comparison result.
3.5 Cloud Assisted Privacy-preserving Image Annotation
After the introduction of my privacy-preserving distance comparison design, in this
section, I illustrate CAPIA by integrating PL1C and PKLC in image annotation task
with cloud deployment. My designs consists of five major procedures. In the System
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Setup, the user selects system parameters, extracts and pre-processes feature vectors
of images in a pre-annotated dataset. Then, the user executes the Data Encryption
procedure to encrypt these processed feature vectors. Both the System Setup procedure
and the Data Encryption procedure are one-time cost in CAPIA. Later on, the user
can use the Secure Annotation Request procedure to generate an encrypted annotation
request. On receiving the request, the cloud server performs the Privacy-preserving
Annotation on Cloud procedure to return encrypted keywords for the requested image.
At the end, the user obtains final keywords by executing the Final Keyword Selection
procedure.
3.5.1 System Setup
To perform the one-time setup of CAPIA system, the user first prepares a pre-annotated
image dataset with n images, which can be obtained from public sources, such as
IAPR TC-12 [71], LabelMe [72], etc. For each image Ii in the dataset, the user ex-
tracts seven feature vectors [Vi,RGB,Vi,HSV ,Vi,LAB,Vi,G,Vi,GQ,Vi,H ,Vi,HQ]. Com-
pared with other five feature vectors that have dimension up to 256, Vi,H and Vi,HQ
have a high dimension as 4096. To guarantee the efficiency while processing feature
vectors, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [73] is utilized to reduce the dimension
of Vi,H and Vi,HQ. According to my experimental evaluation in Section 4.3.2, PCA
based dimension reduction with proper setting can significantly improve the efficiency
of CAPIA with slight accuracy loss. After that, L1 normalization will be performed
for each feature vector, which normalizes elements in these vectors to [-1,1]. Besides
Vi,LAB, the user also increases each element in Vi,k, k ∈ {RGB,HSV,G,GQ,H,HQ}
as vi,k,j = vi,k,j + 1 to avoid negative values. Next, each element in all feature vec-
tors are scaled by the same value. Given three processed vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}, it is
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easy to verify that the sign of L1 distance comparison result DL1ab −DL1ac and KL-
Divergence comparison result DKLab−DKLac with processed vectors remain the same
as that using original vectors. Six feature vectors that use L1 distance for similarity
measurement are concatenated as a mL1-dimensional vector Vi,L1. Vi,LAB is denoted
as a mKL-dimensional vector Vi,KL for expression simplicity. It is easy to verify that
DL1L1ab = DL1
RGB
ab +DL1
HSV
ab +DL1
G
ab +DL1
GQ
ab +DL1
H
ab +DL1
HQ
ab .
3.5.2 Dataset Encryption
Given an image Ii in the pre-annotated dataset, its keywords {Ki,t} are first encrypted
using AES. Then, feature vectors Vi,L1 and Vi,KL are encrypted as Ci,L1 and Ci,KL
using the Data Encryption methods in my proposed PL1C and PKLC schemes respec-
tively. During the encryption, same secret keys SL1, SKL, public parameter w, and
random number r will be used for all images. However, different error vector ei and
noise term εi are generated for each image Ii correspondingly. The user also computes
STL1Ss,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL, in which Ss,L1 and Ss,KL are secret keys for the encryption of
later annotation requests. These Ci,L1, Ci,KL and encrypted keywords of each image Ii,
as well as STL1Ss,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL are outsourced to the cloud.
3.5.3 Secure Annotation Request
When the user has a new image Is for annotation, he/she first extracts seven feature
vectors as Vs, s ∈ [RGB,HSV,LAB,G,GQ,H,HQ]. These vectors will be normalized
and scaled to output Vs,L1 and Vs,KL as that in the System Setup procedure. Then,
the user processes and encrypts Vs,L1 and Vs,KL as Cs,L1 and Cs,KL using the Request
Generation methods in my PL1C and PKLC schemes respectively. For each annotation
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request, the user generates a new positive random number rs and a new error vector es.
Cs,L1 and Cs,KL are sent to the cloud as the annotation request.
3.5.4 Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud
On receiving the request, the cloud first outputs Vi,L1V
T
s,L1 and Vi,KLV
T
s,KL for each
image in the pre-annotated dataset as
Vi,L1V
T
s,L1 = vec(S
T
L1Ss,L1)d
vec(Ci,L1C
T
s,L1)
T
w
cq (3.8)
Vi,KLV
T
s,KL = vec(S
T
KLSs,KL)d
vec(Ci,KLC
T
s,KL)
T
w
cq (3.9)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the cloud ranks all the images according to their combined
distances to the request image Is. Specifically, a distance comparison candidate Compi =
−2(Vi,L1VTs,L1) + Vi,KLVTs,KL can be generated for each image Ii. Given Ia and Ib for
example, the cloud can rank them as
Compa − Compb (3.10)
= 2(Vb,L1V
T
s,L1 −Va,L1VTs,L1)
+ Va,L1V
T
s,KL −Vb,KLVTs,KL
= rs(DL1
L1
as −DL1L1bs ) + 2(εb − εa)
+ rs(DKL
LAB
as −DKLLABbs ) + (εb − εa)
= rs(Disas −Disbs) + 3(εb − εa)
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As rs is a positive value and rs >> (εb − εa), the cloud can figure out which image is
more relative to Is according to the above distance comparison result. According to
the ranking of all pre-annotated images, the cloud outputs top related images to Is and
denotes them as a set RST. Finally, the cloud returns distance comparison candidates
Compi, i ∈ RST as well as corresponding encrypted keywords back to the user.
3.5.5 Final Keyword Selection
In this stage, the user first decrypts encrypted keywords and obtains Ki,t, i ∈ RST ,
where Ki,t is the t-th pre-annotated keyword in image Ii. Then, the user computes
distances Disis, i ∈ RST as
Disis = (2r +
mL1∑
j=1
v2s,L1,j) +
Compi
rs
= (2r +
mL1∑
j=1
v2s,L1,j) +
−2(Vi,L1VTs,L1) + Vi,KLVTs,KL
rs
To achieve higher accuracy in keywords selection, I consider that keywords in images
that have smaller distance to the requested one are more relevant. Thus, I define a
real-time weight Wt for each keyword based on distances Disis as
WIi = 1−
Disis∑
i∈RST Disis
(3.11)
Wt =
∑
WIi , for Ii contains Ki,t (3.12)
Specifically, I first figure out the weight WIi of each image according to their distance
based similarity. As my definition in Eq.3.12, images with smaller distance will receive a
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larger weight value. Then, considering the same keyword can appear in multiple images,
the final weight Wt of a keyword Ki,t is generated by adding weights of images that
contain this keyword. Finally, the user selects keywords for his/her image according to
their ranking of weight Wt.
3.6 Preliminaries of CPAR
In CAPIA, for every single annotation request, linear processing of all encrypted records
in a large-scale dataset is required, which hence becomes the performance bottleneck for
practical usage. In order to bypass the latency brought by this linear processing strategy,
I leverage randomized k-dimension forest (RKDF), a member from space partitioning
tree family, as the parallel search index to boost CAPIA’s performance in terms of
efficiency. Different from many other index structures that are only efficient for low-
dimensional data, RKDF is featured by its performance in handling high-dimensional
data. In CAPIA, data vectors are over 1300-dimension and thus making RKDF an ef-
fective selection. To understand how the randomized k-dimension forest works, I first
investigate its basic component, k-dimension tree (k-d tree), a space partitioning tree
structure which boosts up nearest vector search speed [74]. I tailored it in my con-
struction to achieve efficient vector search in privacy-preserving manner. Due to the
top-down traversal algorithm underlying k-d trees, several single-element comparisons
between a few vectors are required. In order to protect the privacy of these single
elements, order-preserving encryption (OPE) is applied in CPAR.
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3.6.1 k-dimension Tree
A k-d tree, is a data structure used for organizing some number of points in a space
with k dimensions. It is a binary search tree with other constraints imposed on it. k-d
trees are very useful for range and nearest neighbor searches. Each level of a k-d tree
splits all children along a specific dimension, using a hyperplane that is perpendicular
to the corresponding axis. At the root of the tree all children will be split based on
the first dimension. Each level down in the tree divides on the dimension with the
highest deviation. This procedure is performed recursively on both the left and right
sub-trees until the max trees are only composed of one element. More details about this
k-dimension tree structure and its evaluation are available in ref [74].
3.6.2 Order-preserving Encryption
Order-preserving symmetric encryption is a deterministic encryption scheme whose en-
cryption function preserves numerical ordering of the plaintexts. Given two integers a
and b in which a < b, by encrypting with OPE, the order of a and b is preserved as
OPE(a) < OPE(b). More details about this OPE encryption scheme and its security
proof are available in ref [75, 76].
3.7 Privacy-preserving Distance Comparison with Random-
ized k-d Forest
In this section, I first introduce the top-down traversal and back trace search in an
unprotected randomized k-d forest. In addition, in order to address the privacy concerns
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when integrating the randomized k-d forest in the automatic image annotation, I propose
two privacy-preserving distance comparison scheme with RKDF.
3.7.1 Randomized k-d Forest Search
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Figure 3.1: Randomized k-d Forest
Vreq is the request vector and each Vi is stored in each tree node i. Dis(·) is an arbitrary
distance calculation function and Dis(Vreq,Hi) is the distance between the request vector Vreq
and Nodei’s hyperplane. VqL is the least closest vector to Vreq in priority queue Queue. (a)
represents top-down traversal; (b) represents back trace search and (c) represents queue push
process.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, a RKDF is composed of a set of parallel k-d trees. For each
Nodei in a k-d tree [74], it stores a feature vector Vi of dataset image Ii. In addition, each
non-leaf node also stores a split field si to generate a hyperplane that divides the vector
space into two parts. Each Nodej in left sub-tree of Nodei has Nodej [si] ≤ Nodei[si] and
vice versa, as described in ref [74]. To search nodes that store vectors with top-smallest
distances to a request vector Vreq, a parallel search among all trees in the forest is
performed. Specifically, each tree is traversed in a top-down manner by comparing the
split field values of Vreq and the vector Vi stored in each Nodei as an example shown in
Fig.3.1(a). The traversal selects the left branch to continue if Vreq[si] ≤ Vi[si] and vice
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versa. Once the traversal reaches a leaf node, the vector stored in that leaf node is pushed
into a priority queue Queue as a current close candidate to Vreq. The queue push process
is shown in Fig.3.1(c). Note that during the search process, this Queue keeps updating
to hold L closest vectors to Vreq and is shared by all trees in the forest. After that, a
back trace search starts by iterating all the nodes in the path from the parent of the
current node to the root node as an example shown in Fig.3.1(b). When reaching a Nodei
during the back trace, a same queue push is executed to judge whether to add Nodei to
Queue as illustrated in Fig.3.1(c). For each Nodei in this path, a distance comparison
between Dis(Vreq,Hi) and Dis(Vreq,VqL) is compared, where Dis(Vreq,Hi) is the
distance between Vreq and a Nodei’s hyperplane. Hi can be considered as the projection
vector of Vreq on Nodei’s hyperplane. VqL is the Lth vector in Queue which meets
Dis(Vreq,Vqi) ≤ Dis(Vreq,VqL),∀Vqi ∈ Queue. If Dis(Vreq,Hi) > Dis(Vreq,VqL),
the back trace continues to the next node in this path. Otherwise, the sibling branch
of Nodei needs to be searched using the top-down traversal. In RKDF, once a node has
been searched in one k-d tree, it will be marked and does not need to be checked again
in the other trees. To further enhance the search efficiency of a RKDF, approximated
search strategy can be adopted. In particular, based on the hypothesis that feature
vectors of similar images are likely to be grouped in the same branch, there is a high
probability that the targeted optimal top similar vectors will be visited well before
visiting all nodes in each k-d tree. In Section 6.2, I will evaluate the relationship among
the approximation strength, accuracy, and efficiency. The detailed search of a RKDF is
provided in Algorithm 1. For more details about the RKDF, please refer to ref [59].
To protect the privacy of user’s data during the cloud-based annotation, the image data
associated with the RKDF need to be encrypted. Furthermore, these encrypted data
shall support corresponding search operations in RKDF, which include:
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• The comparison between Vreq[si] and Vi[si] in the top-down traversal for path
selection.
• The comparison between Dis(Vreq,Hi) and Dis(Vreq,VqL) during the back trace
process.
• The comparison between Dis(Vreq,Va) and Dis(Vreq,Vb), i.e., distances from
the request vector to two different images’ feature vectors, which is used in the
queue push process.
In order to support these operations, a challenge needs to be resolved: The origi-
nal privacy-preserving comparison scheme for L1 distance (PL1C) and KL-Divergence
(PKLC) in CAPIA cannot be simply re-used in CPAR. That’s because PL1C and
PKLC can only support the privacy-preserving distance comparison between two vec-
tors. However, while searching in a RKDF, the distance comparison between a vector
and a hyperplane needs to be supported in the back trace process and queue push
process of RKDF. In order to resolve this issue, I re-design PL1C and PKLC to get
PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF , standing for PL1C and PKLC for RKDF. PL1C−RF
and PKLC − RF enable the aforementioned privacy-preserving distance comparison
between two vectors as well as between one vector and one hyperplane. In addition, I
integrate order-preserving encryption [75, 76] into CPAR to protect the comparison of
split field values in the top-down traversal of RKDF.
3.7.2 PL1C−RF : Privacy-preserving L1 Distance Comparison for Ran-
domized k-d Forest
In PL1C − RF , I consider two types of L1 distance comparison that are required in
the queue push and back trace process of RKDF: 1) DL1ac and DL1bc for three image
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feature vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}; 2) DL1hc and DL1bc for a hyperplane projected vector
Ha and two image feature vectors Vb,Vc. DL1hc is measured by the L1 distance between
Ha[sa] and Vc[sa], where sa is the split field of the Nodea. To be more specific, DL1hc is
calculated by projecting Vc on Nodea’s hyperplane and then calculating the L1 distance
between Vc and the projected vector Ha.
Data Preparation: The data preparation for PL1C − RF is the same as PL1C for
the reason that both of them use the same local descriptor in [22] and the JL-Lemma
based approximation in [70]. Given three m-dimensional integer vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c},
an approximated vector V̂i = [v̂i1, v̂i2, · · · , v̂im̂], i ∈ {a, b} is generated using JL-Lemma.
The detailed construction of the rest stages in PL1C-RF is presented in Fig.3.2. The
user first encrypts the image feature vectors and its corresponding hyperplane projected
vector (if exists), and then stores them in the cloud. Later on the user can generate en-
crypted L1 distance comparison request and ask the cloud to conduct privacy-preserving
comparison. On receiving the request, the cloud can conduct two types of L1 distance
comparison using ciphertext only according to user’s request.
Same as PL1C, PL1C − RF maintains its vector privacy protection by keeping the
approximated distance comparison result scaled and obfuscated by rc, εb− εa and εb− ε
′
a
as shown in 3.7.2.
3.7.3 PKLC−RF : Privacy-preserving KL-Divergence Comparison for
Randomized k-d Forest
In PKLC − RF , I also consider two types of KL-Divergence comparison similar to
PL1C −RF : 1) DKLac and DKLbc for three image feature vectors Vi, i ∈ {a, b, c}; 2)
DKLhc and DKLbc for a hyperplane projected vector Ha and two image feature vectors
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Construction of PL1C −RF
Data Encryption:
1. The first step of PL1C − RF ’s encryption stage is similar as in PL1C. Three elements
are added to V̂i and update it to V̂i = [v̂i1, v̂i2, · · · , v̂im̂, r− 12
∑m̂
j=1 v̂
2
ij , εi,−1], i ∈ {a, b}.
2. If V̂i is stored in a non-leaf node, generate a (2m̂+ 2)-dimensional hyperplane projected
vector as Ĥi = [0, · · · , v̂isi , · · · , 0, r− 12 v̂
2
isi , ε
′
i, 0, · · · , 0− 1, 0 · · · , 0], where r− 12 v̂
2
isi is the
(m̂+ 1)th element, −1 is the (m̂+ 2 + si)th element, and si is the split field of node i.
3. Encrypt V̂i and Ĥi using the Encryption algorithm of IVE as C(V̂i) = S
−1(wV̂i+ei)
T
and C(Ĥi) = S
′−1(wĤi + e
′
i)
T . C(V̂i),C(Ĥi), and w are outsourced to the cloud.
Request Generation:
1. In order to support the privacy-preserving RKDF search, compared to PL1C, one more
element is required to be appended to V̂c as V̂c = [rcv̂c1, · · · , rcv̂cm̂, rc, 1, 12rc
∑m̂
j=1 v̂
2
cj ],
in which rc is a positive random number.
2. Generate Ĥc = [rcv̂c1, · · · , rcv̂cm̂, rc, 1, 12rcv̂
2
c1, · · · , 12rcv̂
2
cm̂] as hyperplane projected vec-
tor.
3. V̂c and Ĥc are encrypted as C(V̂c) = S
−1
c (wV̂c + ec)
T and C(Ĥc) = S
′−1
c (wĤc + e
′
c)
T .
C(V̂c), C(Ĥc), S
TSc and S
′TS
′
c are sent to the cloud as request.
Distance Comparison:
Type-1: Compare DL1ac, DL1bc
1. Given C(V̂a), C(V̂b) and C(V̂c), compute d vec(C(V̂a)C(V̂c)
T )
w
cq, d vec(C(V̂b)C(V̂c)
T )
w
cq and
decrypt them as V̂aV̂
T
c and V̂bV̂
T
c as Eq.3.2.
2. Compare the approximated L1 distance comparison as V̂bV̂
T
c − V̂aV̂
T
c ≈ rc2 (DL1ac −
DL1bc) + (εb − εa).
Type-2: Compare DL1hc, DL1bc,
1. Given C(Ĥa), C(V̂b), C(V̂c) and C(Ĥc), compute d vec(C(Ĥa)C(Ĥc)
T )
w
cq,
d vec(C(V̂b)C(V̂c)
T )
w
cq and decrypt them as ĤaĤ
T
c and V̂bV̂
T
c as Eq.3.2.
2. Compare the approximated L1 distance comparison as V̂bV̂
T
c − ĤaĤ
T
c ≈ rc2 (DL1hc −
DL1bc) + (εb − ε
′
a).
Figure 3.2: Construction of PL1C −RF
Vb,Vc. In addition, the KL-Divergence DKLhc between a image feature vector and
a hyperplane is measured by the KL-Divergence between Ha[sa] and Vc[sa], where sa
is the split field of Nodea. Similar as PL1C − RF , PKLC − RF is also calculated by
projecting Vc on Nodea’s hyperplane and then calculating the KL-Divergence between
Vc and the projected vector Ha.
The detailed construction of PKLC−RF is presented in Fig.3.3. In the data encryption
stage, the image feature vectors and corresponding hyperplane projected vector (if ex-
ists) are encrypted and stored in the cloud. On receiving the encrypted KL-Divergence
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comparison request from the user, the cloud conducts two types of privacy-preserving
KL-Divergence comparison using ciphertext only according to user’s request. Similar to
my PL1C construction, I have rc > 0 and rc >> (εb− εa). Therefore, the cloud can fig-
ure out which KL-Divergence is smaller based on the scaled and obfuscated comparison
result.
Construction of PKLC −RF
Data Encryption:
1. As PKLC, PKLC − RF appends m + 2 elements as Vi = [vi1, vi2, · · · , vim, vi1 ×
log(vi1), · · · , vim × log(vim), r, εi], where r is a random number and εi is a small ran-
dom noise. If Vi is stored in a non-leaf node in RKDF, its corresponding hyperplane
projected vector is processed as Hi = [0, · · · , visi , · · · , 0, · · · , visi × log(visi), · · · , 0, r, ε
′
i],
where si is the split field of the node, visi , visi × log(visi) and r are the sith, (m+ si)th
and (2m+ 1)th elements respectively.
2. Encrypt Vi and Hi with the Encryption algorithm of IVE as C(Vi) = S
−1(wVi + ei)
T
and C(Hi) = S
−1(wHi + e
′
i)
T .
Request Generation:
1. The request generation stage is exactly the same as in PKLC. Unlike PL1C−RF which
needs to add one more element for the L1 distance comparison between a vector and a
hyperplane, the data encryption stage in PKLC−RF does not append additional element
compared with PKLC. Ciphertext C(Vc) and key S
TSc are sent to the cloud as request.
KL-Divergence Comparison:
Type-1: Compare DKLac, DKLbc
1. Compute d vec(C(Va)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq, d vec(C(Vb)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq and decrypts them as VaVTc and
VbV
T
c using the Decryption of IVE in Section 3.3.2.
2. Compare KL divergence as VaV
T
c −VbVTc = rc(DKLac −DKLbc) + (εb − εa).
Type-2: Compare DKLhc, DKLbc
1. Compute d vec(C(Ha)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq, d vec(C(Vb)C(Vc)
T )
w
cq and decrypts as HaVTc and VbVTc
using the Decryption of IVE as Eq.3.2.
2. Compare KL divergence as HaV
T
c −VbVTc = rc(DKLhc −DKLbc) + (εb − ε
′
a).
Figure 3.3: Construction of PKLC −RF
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3.8 Cloud-Assisted Privacy-preserving Image Annotation
with Randomized k-d Forest
3.8.1 Detailed Construction of CPAR
In this section, I show the detail construction of CPAR by adding PL1C − RF and
PKLC − RF to boost the similar images search process during the image annotation
task. CPAR shares a similar high-level major procedures with CAPIA. In the System
Setup, in addition to system parameters selection, image feature extraction and pre-
processing, the user also uses these feature vectors to build a RKDF. Then, the user
executes the RKDF Encryption procedure to encrypt all data associated with nodes
in the RKDF. Both the System Setup procedure and the RKDF Encryption procedure
are one-time cost in CPAR. Then, Secure Annotation Request is performed to generate
an encrypted annotation request. Followed by that, Privacy-preserving Annotation on
Cloud and Final Keyword Selection find the user a group of top similar images and help
the user determine the final keyword set for the requested image.
3.8.1.1 System Setup
The first few steps in system setup procedure follows the same path as CAPIA in Section
3.5.1. mL1-dimensional vector Vi,L1 and mKL-dimensional vector Vi,KL are extracted
for each image from a pre-defined dataset. After that, a RKDF is constructed with
feature vector space {Vi}1≤i≤n, in which each node in a single tree is associated with
one Vi. For each non-leaf node in RKDF, its split field element Vi[si] is stored in a set
SF . In CPAR, the RKDF contains ten parallel k-d trees.
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3.8.1.2 RKDF Encryption
In this stage, CPAR first executes the same process as in Section 3.5.2 to encrypt key-
words {Ki,t} by AES and get the encrypted feature vectors C(Vi,L1) and C(Vi,KL).
C(Vi,L1) and C(Vi,KL) are then stored in the corresponding Nodei of the RKDF.
For each non-leaf node, encrypted hyperplane projected vectors C(Hi,L1),C(Hi,KL)
are generated and added into Nodei using the data encryption processes described in my
PL1C−RF and PKLC−RF . In addition, for the split field element Vi[si] of each non-
leaf node, an order-preserving encryption is executed and the ciphertext OPE(Vi[si]) is
stored in Nodei. After the encryption, each node in the RKDF only contains encrypted
data as
• Non-leaf Node: [C(Vi,L1),C(Vi,KL),C(Hi,L1),C(Hi,KL), OPE(Vi[si]), AES({Ki,t})]
• Leaf Node: [C(Vi,L1),C(Vi,KL), AES({Ki,t})]
During the encryption process, same secret keys SL1, S
′
L1, SKL, public parameter w,
and random number r will be used for all images. However, different error vector ei, e
′
i
and noise term εi, ε
′
i are generated for each image Ii correspondingly. The user also
computes STL1Ss,L1, S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL, in which Ss,L1, S
′
s,L1 and Ss,KL are secret
keys for the encryption of later annotation requests. The encrypted RKDF, STL1Ss,L1,
S
′T
L1S
′
s,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL are outsourced to the cloud.
3.8.1.3 Secure Annotation Request
CPAR shares the same process for the secure annotation request with CAPIA as stated in
3.5.3. The user can generate the features of the image to be annotated and then encrypt
them as C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), and C(Vs,KL) using the Request Generation of PL1C−RF
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and PKLC−RF schemes respectively. For each annotation request, the user generates
a new positive random number rs and new error vectors es, e
′
s. Meanwhile, for each
element sfj in the split field set SF generated in System Setup, the user encrypts Vs[sfj ]
using order-preserving encryption asOPE(Vs[sfj ]). C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), C(Vs,KL) and
{OPE(Vs[sfj ])} are sent to the cloud as the annotation request.
3.8.1.4 Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud
On receiving the encrypted request, the cloud first performs a privacy-preserving search
over the encrypted RKDF. As described in Algorithm 1, the cloud conducts parallel
search over each encrypted tree in the RKDF. There are three places that require the
cloud to conduct privacy-preserving computation over encrypted data:
• During the top-down traversal, as the split field element of each non-leaf node is
encrypted using order-preserving encryption, the cloud can directly compare their ci-
phertexts (line 7) to determine which node to be checked next.
• In the back trace process, the cloud needs to perform privacy-preserving comparison
to determine whether the current node’s sibling branch needs to be searched (line 24 to
29). In particular, given C(Vs,L1), C(Hs,L1), C(VqL,L1), C(Hparent,L1), C(Vs,KL),
C(VqL,KL), and C(Hparent,KL), the cloud first uses type-2 distance comparison in
PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF to compute
VqL,L1V
T
s,L1, VqL,KLV
T
s,KL,
Hparent,L1H
T
s,L1, Hparent,KLV
T
s,KL
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Then, the distance comparison is executed as
CompqL = −2(VqL,L1VTs,L1) + VqL,KLVTs,KL
Comph = −2(Hparent,L1HTs,L1) + Hparent,KLVTs,KL
CompqL − Comph (3.13)
= rs(DL1
L1
qL,s −DL1L1parent,s) + 2(ε
′
parent − εqL)
+rs(DKL
LAB
qL,s −DKLLABparent,s) + (ε
′
parent − εqL)
= rs(Dis(VqL,Vs)−Dis(Hparent,Vs))
+3(ε
′
parent − εqL)
where VqL is the least closest vector to Vreq in priority queue Queue. As rs is a
positive value and rs >> (ε
′
parent− εqL), the sign of CompqL−Comph is consistent with
Dis(VqL,Vs)−Dis(Hparent,Vs).
• In the Queue push process (line 30-37), privacy-preserving distance comparison is
needed to determine whether a new node shall be added. Specifically, given C(Vs,L1),
C(VNode,L1), C(VqL, L1), C(Vs,KL), C(VNode,KL), C(VqL,KL), the cloud use type-1
distance comparison in PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF to perform distance comparison
as
CompNode = −2(VNode,L1VTs,L1) + VNode,KLVTs,KL
CompqL = −2(VqL,L1VTqL,L1) + Vcur,KLVTs,KL
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CompNode − CompqL (3.14)
= rs(DL1
L1
Node,s −DL1L1qL,s) + 2(εqL − εNode)
+rs(DKL
LAB
Node,s −DKLLABqL,s ) + (εqL − εNode)
= rs(Dis(VNode,Vs)−Dis(VqL,Vs))
+3(εqL − εNode)
To this end, the cloud is able to perform all operations required by a RKDF search
in the privacy-preserving manner, and obtain a Queue of nodes that stores data of top
related images to the request. The cloud returns distance comparison candidates (type-1
distance) Compi, i ∈ Queue as well as corresponding encrypted keywords back to the
user.
3.8.1.5 Final Keyword Selection
After the user retrieves the keyword set Ki,t from the the cloud returned data, he/she
can computes distance Dis(Vi,Vs) = (2r +
∑mL1
j=1 v
2
s,L1,j) +
−2(Vi,L1VTs,L1)+Vi,KLV
T
s,KL
rs
as in 3.11. Following 3.12, the user can also figure out the weight ranking Wt of each
keyword Ki,t and selects keywords for the image.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce privacy-preserving distance comparison design PL1C and
PKLC along with their enhanced modules PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF . I integrate
these modules in a practical cloud-assisted image annotation task to show their utility in
imagery data analysis. Moreover, my privacy-preserving distance comparison modules
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Input : Encrypted Search Request (Req) for Vs, Encrypted RKDF with a set of Trees {Tk},
approximation power AP − X
Output: Encrypted Nodes Associated with Top Related Images to the Request.
Initialization Queue = [], Path = [] (Searched Path), V is = [] (Visited Nodes), Nodek=Tk.root;
Each tree Tk executes topDownTraversal() and backTraceSearch() in parallel, Queue and V is
are shared among all trees;
Function topDownTraversal(Req, Nodek):
if Nodek is not null then
return;
end
Vi ←− Nodek.Vi;
if OPE(Vs[si]) ≤ OPE(Vi[si]) then
Nodek = topDownTraversal(Nodek.left-child);
else
Nodek = topDownTraversal(Nodek.right-child);
end
if Nodek 6∈ V is then
V is.push(Nodek);
Queue.push(Nodek);
end
Path.push(Nodek);
return Nodek;
Function backTraceSearch(Req, Nodek):
if V is.length() > AP − X× Nodes Number then
return Queue;
end
if Path is not null then
parent←− Path.pop();
end
if parent 6∈ V is then
V is.push(parent);
Queue.push(parent);
end
//Privacy-preserving distance comparison is achieved by PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF ,
VqL is the least closest vector to Vs in Queue
if Dis(VqL,Vs) < Dis(Hparent,Vs)) then
backTraceSearch(Req, parent);
else
Nodek = topDownTraversal(Req,Nodek.sibling);
end
return Queue;
Function Queue.push(Node):
//Each Nodeq in Queue are ordered by Dis(Vs,VNodeq )
if Queue.length() < Defined Size L then
Add Node into Queue by order;
else
if NodeqL in Queue has Dis(Vs,VNode) < Dis(Vs,VqL) then
Remove NodeqL from Queue;
Add Node into Queue by order;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving RKDF Search
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and privacy-preserving randomized k-d forest can also be utilized as independent tools
for other related fields, especially for efficient similarity measurement on encrypted data.
In the next chapter, I will analyze the security of my design and provide experiment
results on my prototype implementation.
Chapter 4
Evaluation of Privacy Protection
Modules for Descriptor Based
Image Analysis
In this chapter, I first analyze the security of my design against several attacks. Then
I provide experimental results to evaluate the practical performance of my privacy pro-
tection modules as well as their enhancement for descriptor based image analysis stated
in Chapter 3.
4.1 Security Analysis
In CAPIA, I have the following privacy related data: feature vectors
{Vi,L1,Vi,KL}1≤i≤n and keywords of image Ii in the pre-annotated dataset; feature
vectors Vs,L1, Vs,KL of the image requested for annotation. As keywords are encrypted
using standard AES encryption, I consider them secure against the cloud server as well
43
Chapter 4. Evaluation of Privacy Protection Modules for Descriptor Based Image
Analysis 44
as outside adversaries. With regards to Vi,L1, Vi,KL, Vs,L1, Vs,KL, they are encrypted
using the encryption scheme of IVE [68] after pre-processing as presented in my PL1C
and PKLC schemes. The IVE scheme [68] has been proved to be secure based on the
well-known Learning with Errors (LWE) hard problem [77]. Thus, given the ciphertexts
Ci,L1, Ci,KL, Cs,L1, Cs,KL only, it is computational infeasible for the cloud server or
outside adversaries to recover Vi,L1, Vi,KL, Vs,L1, Vs,KL.
4.1.1 Security of Outsourcing STL1Ss,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL
As STL1Ss,L1 and S
T
KLSs,KL are used in the same manner, I use S
TSs to denote them
for expression simplicity. Different from the original Encryption algorithm of IVE, the
user in CAPIA also outsources STSs to the cloud besides ciphertexts Ci,L1, Ci,KL,
Cs,L1, Cs,KL. As all elements in S and Ss are randomly selected, elements in their
multiplication STSs have the same distribution as these elements in S and Ss [78].
Thus, given STSs, the cloud server is not be able to extract S or Ss directly and use
them to decrypt Ci,L1, Ci,KL, Cs,L1, Cs,KL. By combining S
TSs with ciphertexts Ci,L1
and Cs,L1 (same as that for Ci,KL and Cs,KL), the cloud can obtain
STSsCi,L1 = S
TSsS
−1(wVi,L1 + ei)
T
STSsCs,L1 = S
TSsS
−1
s (wVs,L1 + ei)
T = ST (wVs,L1 + ei)
T
From the above two equations, it is clear that the combination of STSs, Ci,L1 and
STSs, Cs,L1 only transfer them to the ciphertexts of Vi,L1 and Vs,L1 that encrypted
using the IVE scheme with new keys STSsS
−1 and ST respectively. As STSsS
−1 and
ST are random keys and unknown to the cloud, recovering Vi,L1, Vs,L1 from S
TSsCi,L1,
STSsCs,L1 still become the LWE problem as proved in ref [68]. To this end, S
TSs only
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helps the cloud to perform distance comparison in CAPIA, but does not bring advantages
to recover feature vectors compared with the given ciphertexts only scenario.
4.1.2 Known Ciphertexts-Image Pairs
I now consider that the cloud server gets a set of ciphertexts-image pairs from the
background analysis as {Vi,L1,Ci,L1} ({Vs,L1,Cs,L1}, {Vi,KL,Ci,KL}, {Vs,KL,Cs,KL}
respectively). In ref [79], a linear analysis attack based on ciphertext-image pairs is
introduced to recover vectors from their distance comparison result. In particular, in-
stead of trying to recovering feature vectors or secret keys directly from ciphertexts,
such an attack attempts to recover the vectors from the distance comparison result by
constructing and solving enough number (i.e., greater than the dimension of vector) of
linear equations. To launch this kind of linear analysis attack to CAPIA, there are two
necessary requirements that need to be fulfilled simultaneously: 1) The cloud obtains at
least m ciphertext-image pairs, where m is the dimension of feature vectors; 2) The cloud
has access to the exact L1 distance and KL Divergence comparison results. As shown in
Eq.3.4 and Eq.3.7, CAPIA only provides scaled and obfuscated comparison results by
adding noise terms εi and random scaling factor rc. As a result, the cloud cannot fulfill
the second requirement to launch a successful linear analysis attack to CAPIA. To this
end, CAPIA is secure even a set of ciphertexts-image pairs are obtained by the cloud
server.
4.1.3 Request Unlinkability
The request unlinkability in CAPIA is guaranteed by the randomization for each request.
Specifically, each query request Vs,L1,Vs,KL is element-wise obfuscated with different
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Figure 4.1: Error rate of Approximation and Dimension of Approximated Vector
(PCA− 32)
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random error terms es and random number rs during the encryption, which makes the
obfuscated Vs,L1,Vs,KL have the same distribution as these random values in es and rc
[78]. Thus, by changing es and rc during the encryption of different requests, CAPIA
outputs different random ciphertexts, even for requests generated from the same image.
4.2 Evaluation of CAPIA
To evaluate the performance of CAPIA, I implemented a prototype using Python 2.7.
In my implementation, Numpy [80] is used to support efficient multi-dimension array
operations. OpenCV [81] is used to extract the color-space features of the images and
build the filter kernels to generate the Gabor filter results. Pywt [82] is adopted to
perform Haar wavelet and get the corresponding Haar results. Sklearn [83] is used to
perform the PCA transformation. I use the well-known IAPR TC-12 [84] as the pre-
annotated dataset, which contains 20,000 annotated images and the average number of
keywords for each image is 5.7. All tests are performed on a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7
Macbook Pro with OS X 10.11.6 installed.
In the rest of this section, n is the total number of images in the pre-annotated dataset;
mL1 and mKL are dimensions of vectors Vi,L1 and Vi,KL after pre-processing respec-
tively; PCA−X is used to denote the strength of PCA transformation applied to Vi,H
and Vi,HQ in Vi,L1, which compresses their dimensions from 4096 to
4096
X . PCA− 128,
PCA − 64, PCA − 32, PCA − 16, and PCA − 8 are evaluated in my experiments to
balance the efficiency and accuracy of CAPIA. I also use DOTm to denote a dot product
operation between to two m-dimensional vectors.
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4.2.1 System Setup and Dataset Encryption
To perform the one-time setup in CAPIA, the user pre-processes feature vectors of each
image in the pre-annotated image dataset. Specifically, the user first performs JL-Lemma
based approximation over Vi,L1 to make Vi,L1 compatible with my PL1C. As discussed
in Section 3.4.2, there is a trade-off between the approximation accuracy of L1 distance
and length of the approximated vector that determines efficiency of follow up privacy-
preserving operations. To balance such a trade-off, I evaluate different parameters for
approximation as shown in Fig.4.1 (a)-(d). According to my results, I suggest to set
α = 1 and γ = 100 which introduces 3.61% error rate for L1 distance computation, and
extends the dimension of Vi,L1 from 864 to 1296 under the setting of PCA − 32. The
selection of PCA strength will be discussed and evaluated in Section 4.3.2. Specifically,
the error rate drops fast when α < 1 and becomes relative stable when α > 1. Meanwhile,
the dimension of the approximated vector increases linearly to the value of α. With
regard to γ, the dimension of the approximated vector becomes relative stable when
γ > 100, however, the error rate still increases when γ > 100. As shown in Fig.4.2
(a), such an approximation setting makes the pre-processing procedure cost 1471ms to
118ms for each image with PCA setting from No PCA to PCA− 128.
After the pre-processing, {Vi,L1,Vi,KL}1≤i≤n will be encrypted using the Data Encryp-
tion procedures of my PL1C and PKLC schemes respectively. As shown in Eq.3.3 and
Eq.3.6, the encryption of each Vi,L1 and Vi,KL requires (mL1)DOTmL1 and
(mKL)DOTmKL operations respectively. Fig.4.2 (a) shows the total encryption cost for
Vi,L1 and Vi,KL of a pre-annotated image decreases from 1436ms to 4.7ms by increas-
ing the strength of PCA from No PCA to PCA − 128. This is because the dimension
of Vi,L1, i.e., mL1, is determined by the strength of PCA, which is directly correlated
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to the encryption cost of Vi,L1. Same as the system setup, encrypting feature vectors
is also a one-time cost, which does not impact the performance of later on real-time
privacy-preserving image annotation.
4.2.2 Real-time Image Annotation
Efficiency: To annotate a new image in a privacy-preserving manner, the user generates
an encrypted request by pre-processing and encrypting feature vectors of the requested
image. By varying the PCA strength from No PCA to PCA − 128, Fig.4.2 (b) shows
that the request generation spends from 2775ms to 268ms. On receiving the encrypted
request, the cloud first computes distance comparison candidate Compi for each image
Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n in the pre-annotated dataset, which requires a (mL1+1)DOTmL1 operation
and a (mKL + 1)DOTmKL operation as shown in Eq.3.8 and Eq.3.9. By changing the
strength of PCA from No PCA to PCA−128, the computational cost for Compi changes
from 4334ms to 16.9ms as shown in Fig.4.2 (c). This is because the dimension of Vi,L1,
i.e., mL1, is determined by the strength of PCA and mL1 >> mKL (e.g., 1296 v.s. 48
in PCA− 32). Afterwards, the cloud selects encrypted keywords according the ranking
of Compi as Eq.3.10. It is worth to note that the annotation process on cloud can be
easily parallelized for performance optimization. In particular, computation of Compi
for different pre-annotated images are independent with each other, and thus can be
easily parallelized in the cloud computing environment.
Accuracy: I now evaluate the accuracy of CAPIA. In my evaluation, I use the standard
average precision and recall rates to measure the accuracy of keywords annotation as
that in automatic annotation using plaintext images. I use 50 images as annotation
requests, and each image will be assigned ten keywords after automatic annotation.
Each request has two or more related images in the pre-annotated dataset. I use set
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[K1,K2, · · · , ...Kx] to denote distinct keywords annotated for all 50 requested images.
The annotation precision and recall rate for a keyword Kj , 1 ≤ j ≤ x in these 50 requests
are defined as
• precisionKj : number of images assigned Kj correctly in CAPIA divided by the
total number of images assigned Kj in CAPIA.
• recallKj : number of images assigned Kj correctly in CAPIA divided by the number
of images assigned Kj in the ground-truth annotation.
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Figure 4.4: Recall of CAPIA and Annotation without Encryption
To compare the annotation accuracy of CAPIA, I also evaluate the no-privacy-preserving
annotation using the same 50 requests. As shown in Fig.4.3 and Fig.4.4, while providing
strong privacy guarantee, CAPIA introduces less than 2.5% and 7.5% accuracy loss in
terms of average precision and recall rates with PCA setting from No PCA to PCA−
128. In addition, Fig.4.3 and Fig.4.4 also demonstrate that the increasing of PCA
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strength reduces the annotation accuracy of CAPIA to some extent, especially from
PCA− 32 to PCA− 64. Taking the efficiency enhancement brought by PCA together
into consideration, I suggest to use PCA − 32 as an appropriate setting for practical
usage. Specifically, Fig.4.2 demonstrates the efficiency improvement from PCA becomes
relative stable after PCA − 32. Meanwhile, the accuracy loss of CAPIA still increases
quickly after PCA− 32.
In Table 4.2, I present samples of automatically annotated images using CAPIA. On
one hand, CAPIA is highly possible to assign correct keywords to images compared
with human annotation. This observation also confirms the high average recall rate
of CAPIA, since these ground-truth annotations are likely to be covered in CAPIA.
On the other hand, CAPIA also introduces additional keywords that frequently appear
together with these accurate keywords in top related images. These additional keywords
are typically not directly included in human annotations, but are potentially related to
correct keywords. Such a fact also explains why the average precision rate of CAPIA
is relatively low compared with the average recall rate. Overall, my evaluation results
demonstrate that although CAPIA cannot provide perfect keywords selection all the
time compared with human annotation, it is still promising for automatically assigning
keywords to images, and hence fulfilling the fundamental gap between SE schemes and
images.
4.2.3 Communication Cost and Storage Overhead
The communication cost in CAPIA comes from two major parts: annotation request
and encrypted results returned from the cloud server. The encrypted request consists of
a mL1-dimensional vector Cs.L1 and a mKL-dimensional vector Cs.KL. In the PCA−32
setting, the total communication cost for a request is 26KB. Meanwhile, the returned
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Image CAPIA Annotation Human Annotation
floor-tennis-court,
man, woman
floor-tennis-count,
man
sky-blue, highway,
vegetation, ground, bush,
trees, lake, ocean
highway, sky-blue,
trees, vegetation
cloud, sky-blue,
ground, mountain, horse
man, road, grass
ground, cloud
sky-blue, mountain
snow, grass
group-of-persons, sky-blue,
ground, trees, mountain,
ruin-archeological, hat
cloud, hill
trees, ground, man,
sky-blue, group-of-persons
Table 4.1: Sample Annotation Results
result contains encrypted keywords and distance comparison candidates Compi of top 10
related images. Using AES-256 for keywords encryption, the total size for the returned
result is 488 Bytes with the average number of keywords for each pre-annotated image as
5.7. With regard to the storage overhead of CAPIA, it includes two parts for each pre-
annotated image Ii: 1) encrypted feature vectors Ci.L1 and Ci.KL, which are 26KB in
total. 2) Encrypted keywords, which are 480 Bytes as average using AES-256 encryption.
4.3 Evaluation of CPAR
To evaluate the performance of CPAR, I use Python 2.7 to build the prototype of my
privacy-preserving randomized k-d forest. I utilize FLANN library [59] to implement the
non-privacy randomized k-d forest for comparison. All tests are performed on a 3.1 GHz
Intel Core i7 Macbook Pro with OS X 10.14.2 installed as User and a Microsoft Azure
cloud E4-v3 VM with Ubuntu 18.04 LTS installed as Cloud Server. Other experiment
environment configurations, dataset selection and notations stay aligned with CAPIA.
In the rest part of this section, I first provide numerical analysis as well as experimental
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evaluation for each stage of CPAR. Then, I compare CPAR with CAPIA in terms of
efficiency and accuracy.
4.3.1 RKDF Construction and Encryption
To construct an encrypted RKDF, the user first constructs an unencrypted RKDF using
20,000 pre-annotated images, and then replaces data of each node in the RKDF with
their corresponding ciphertexts. The construction of an unencrypted RKDF with 10
k-d trees costs 28.56 seconds. Then, for the pre-processed feature vectors Vi,L1 and
Vi,KL of each image, the user can encrypt them using PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF
with (mL1)DOTmL1 and (mKL)DOTmKL operations respectively, which costs 8.4ms in
total in my implementation. If an image is associated with a non-leaf node in any tree
of the RKDF, encryption for the hyperplane projected vectors Hi,L1 and Hi,KL with
(m
′
L1)DOTm′L1
and (mKL)DOTmKL operations respectively, which costs 54.7ms in total.
In addition, for each non-leaf node, an order-preserving encryption is needed for the split
field, each of which costs 1.4ms. Therefore, to build a 10-tree encrypted RKDF with a
20,000 pre-annotated image dataset, it takes 74.78 minutes in my implementation. It is
noteworthy that the encrypted RKDF construction is one-time offline cost, which does
not impact the performance of later on real-time privacy-preserving image annotation.
4.3.2 Real-time Image Annotation
Request Generation: To annotate a new image in a privacy-preserving manner, the
user pre-processes and encrypts its feature vectors Vs,L1 and Vs,KL using PL1C −RF
and PKLC − RF . Specifically, the encryption of Vs,L1 requires (mL1)DOTmL1 +
(m
′
L1)DOTm′L1
for shown in Fig.3.2, and the encryption of Vs,KL requires (mKL)DOTmKL
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operations as shown in Fig.3.3. In addition, for each element sfj in the split field element
set SF with size of 348 in my implementation, order-preserving encryption are executed
for Vs[sfj ]. As a result, the encrypted request can be efficiently generated with only
534.16ms.
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Figure 4.5: Privacy-preserving Annotation Cost on Cloud with Different Approxima-
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Figure 4.6: Speedup Rate with Different Approximation Power
Privacy-preserving Annotation on Cloud : On receiving the encrypted request, the cloud
performs privacy-preserving RKDF search with top-down traversal, back trace search,
and queue push processes. The top-down traversal only requires a direct comparison
between the ciphertexts under order-preserving encryption, whose cost is negligible com-
pared with the other two processes. In the back trace search, privacy-preserving type-2
distance comparison needs to the executed using PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF . In
particular, two comparison candidates CompqL and Comph are computed with (mL1 +
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1)DOTmL1 +(mKL+1)DOTmKL operations and (m
′
L1+1)DOTm′L1
+(mKL+1)DOTmKL
operations respectively. With regards to the queue push process, privacy-preserving
type-1 distance comparison are executed using PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF , which
requires 2(mL1 + 1)DOTmL1 + 2(mKL+ 1)DOTmKL operations in total. Another impor-
tant parameter that affects the search efficiency is the selection of approximation power
AP − X . As depicted in Fig.4.5, by increasing the approximation power from AP −100
to AP−2.5, the privacy-preserving annotation using encrypted RKDF reduces from
143.72 seconds to 2.98 seconds. Compared with CAPIA [85] that requires 218.46 sec-
onds for one privacy-preserving annotation on cloud and does not support approximate
dataset checking, CPAR can significantly speed it up as depicted in Fig.4.6.
Final Keyword Selection: This process only involves AES decryption and the weights
generation that only requires a small number of additions. As a result, the final keyword
selection can be completed by the user within 318ms.
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Figure 4.7: Accuracy (Recall) of CPAR with Different Approximation Power
Accuracy : I use the same average recall rates as defined in Section 6.2 to evaluate the
accuracy of CPAR. In my evaluation, annotation requests for 50 different images are
submitted, in which each requested image has two or more related images in the pre-
annotated dataset. As shown in Fig.4.7, the accuracy of CPAR reduces from 88.42% to
67.59% when the approximation power increases from AP −100 to AP−2.5. Compared
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Accuracy Compared with CAPIA (%)
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Figure 4.8: Speedup rate of CPAR with Different Accuracy Compared with CAPIA
with CAPIA [85] my scheme achieves the same accuracy by setting the approximation
power as AP − 100. While the increasing of approximation power reduces the accuracy
of CPAR to some extent, it also boosts the efficiency significantly as shown in Fig.4.5.
Compared with CAPIA, Fig.4.8 shows that CPAR can speed up CAPIA by 4×, 11.5×,
18.7×, 25.8×, 43.1× when achieving 97.7%, 91.4%, 88.9%, 84.7%, 80.3% accuracy of
CAPIA respectively. Therefore, CPAR can greatly promote the efficiency the of CAPIA
while retaining comparable accuracy. To balance the efficiency speedup and annotation
accuracy of CPAR, I suggest to set the approximation power as AP − 10, i.e. achieves
88.9% accuracy of CAPIA with 18.7× speedup.
In Table 4.2, I present samples of automatically annotated images using CAPIA and
CPAR with approximation power as AP−10. In the last column I list the human anno-
tation results (ground-truth) for comparison. On one hand, CPAR is highly possible to
assign correct keywords to images compared with human annotation. This observation
also confirms the high average recall rate of CPAR, since these ground-truth annotations
are likely to be covered in CPAR. On the other hand, CPAR also introduces additional
keywords that frequently appear together with these accurate keywords in top related
images. These additional keywords are typically not directly included in human anno-
tations, but are potentially related to correct keywords. Compared with CAPIA, CPAR
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only misses a small portion of ground-truth keywords due to the approximation strat-
egy, which is consistence with my evaluation result in Fig.4.7 and Fig.4.8. Overall, my
evaluation results demonstrate that although CPAR cannot provide perfect keywords se-
lection all the time compared with human annotation, it can still maintain comparable
accuracy as CAPIA and is promising for automatically assigning keywords to images.
Table 4.2: Sample Annotation Comparison between CAPIA and CPAR
Image CPAR Annotation CAPIA Annotation Human Annotation
floor-tennis-court,
man, grass
floor-tennis-court,
man, woman
floor-tennis-court,
man
highway, sky-blue,
trees, vegetation,
ground, ship,
sky, ocean, bush
sky-blue, highway,
vegetation, ground,
bush, trees,
lake, ocean
highway, sky-blue,
trees, vegetation
group-of-persons,
ground, cloud,
man, sky-light,
mountain, door,
chair, floor-other,
column
cloud, sky-blue,
ground, mountain,
horse man,
road, grass
ground, cloud,
sky-blue,
mountain,
snow, grass
group-of-persons,
hat, hill, cloud,
sky-blue, ground,
sky, fabric,
couple-of-persons,
grass
group-of-persons,
sky-blue, ground,
trees, mountain,
ruin-archeological,
hat, cloud, hill
trees, ground,
man, sky-blue,
group-of-persons
In each cell of CPAR and CAPIA annotation results, ground-truth human annotation
results are underlined and bold out.
Communication Cost : The communication cost of CPAR does not have big differ-
ence compared with CAPIA. The encrypted request introduces an additional m
′
L1-
dimensional vector C(Hs,L1) and a set of encrypted split field elements SF . C(Hs)
and SF add 48K and 4KB communication respectively and make the total communi-
cation cost for a request to be 80KB. Meanwhile, since the size of the returned results
contain encrypted keywords and distance comparison candidates is not changed, the
total size for the returned result is maintained at 488 Bytes. Therefore, CPAR does
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not introduce heavy communication on the basis of CAPIA and the communication cost
for each privacy-preserving annotation can be efficiently handled in today’s Internet
environment.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I conduct thorough security analysis to show the security of my design.
I also provide a set of prototype implementation over the well-known IAPR dataset to
demonstrate the practical usage of my privacy-preserving distance comparison design
PL1C and PKLC along with their enhanced modules PL1C −RF and PKLC −RF .
Extensive experiments results show that my modules can achieve promising performance
in terms of efficiency and accuracy while protecting the privacy of user in descriptor based
image analysis tasks.
Chapter 5
Privacy Protection for Deep
Learning Based Image Analysis
To continue with the second research direction on privacy-preserving deep learning based
image analysis, I apply one of the most well-known deep learning models, convolutional
neural network (CNN), in an edge computing setting as an example use case. In this case,
the resource-constrained IoT device offloads its image to the edge device to get analyzed.
My case scenario and problem formulation is the same as in the corresponding section
of Chapter 2, in which the edge device follows the designated algorithm to assist the
analysis but is curious about the content of the IoT uploaded image.
5.1 Introduction
With the recent advances in artificial intelligence, the integration of deep neural networks
and IoT is receiving increasing attention from both academia and industry [86–88]. As
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the representative of deep neural networks, convolutional neural network has been iden-
tified as an prevailing structure to enable a spectrum of intelligent IoT applications [89],
including visual detection, smart security, audio analytics, health monitoring, infras-
tructure inspection, etc. In these applications, pre-trained CNN models are deployed on
IoT devices, with which the corresponding CNN inference tasks can be executed when
real-time application requests are initiated. Nevertheless, due to the high computation
in the inference tasks, deploying CNNs on resource-constrained IoT devices for time-
sensitive services becomes very challenging. For example, popular CNN architectures
(e.g., AlexNet [46], FaceNet [90], and ResNet [91]) for visual detection require billions of
operations for the execution of a single inference task. My evaluation results show that
a single inference task using AlexNet can cost more than two minutes on an IoT device
with comparable computing capability as a Raspberry Pi (Model A).
To soothe IoT devices from heavy computation and energy consumption, offloading CNN
inference tasks to public cloud computing platforms has become a popular choice in the
literature. However, this type of “cloud-backed” system may raise privacy concerns by
sending sensitive data to remote cloud [92]. Moreover, connecting to the cloud can cause
additional latency to the system under network congestion and even make the system
dysfunction when network is off [93]. While research efforts have been made towards
enabling CNN inference over encrypted data using cloud computing [36–44], expensive
cryptographic primitives utilized in them (e.g., homomorphic encryption and multi-party
secure computation) introduce heavy encryption and communication overhead to IoT
devices. Such a performance limitation makes these solutions far away from practical
in support of time-sensitive CNN inference tasks on IoT devices, especially for complex
CNN architectures. For example, a quad-core Raspberry Pi, which outperforms most
resource-constrained IoT devices in terms of computational capability, can perform only
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four Paillier homomorphic encryption per second [45]. Given a single input of AlexNet
which has 227 × 227 × 3 elements, it requires more than 10 hours to complete the en-
cryption, which is impractical for most applications in terms of time delay and energy
consumption. Besides, these research adopt batch processing to improve their perfor-
mance, which is more suitable for the “Data Collection and Post-Processing” routine,
while differently, real-time processing is desired for IoT devices to fulfill time-sensitive
tasks. To the best of my knowledge, enabling real-time execution of complex CNN
inference tasks over encrypted data remains as an open problem.
Besides privacy-preserving real-time CNN inference offloading, one of the other chal-
lenges is regarding data integrity. Since the offloaded computation is resource consum-
ing, the edge devices may not be willing to allocate expensive computational resources
and may tend to cheat the IoT devices by returning random data with the same size
of the desired data. According to [94], in some cases, dishonest edge service may even
discard the data to save resources. Unfortunately, resource-constraint IoT devices are
not able, or need to pay a considerable computational cost, to judge the correctness of
the returned results from the cloud. How to effectively detect such dishonest behaviors
while maintaining the lightweight computation on IoT devices and overall performance
in time-sensitive CNN inference tasks is also an essential challenge to be solved.
In this chapter, I design privacy-preserving execution module for compute-intense layers
to address such a challenging problem. I apply my designed modules in a time-sensitive
deep learning based image analysis task to enable a real-time privacy-preserving CNN
inference scheme for resource-constrained IoT devices. Different from existing “cloud-
backed” designs, my design leverages edge computing to promote the efficiency of offload-
ing IoT data, because it can effectively ameliorate the network latency and availability
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issue [95]. More importantly, my privacy-preserving modules include a novel online/of-
fline encryption to assure the real-time CNN inference over encrypted IoT data can be
efficiently executed by general edge computing devices (e.g., regular laptop computers),
and hence avoiding the reliance on powerful cloud servers for computing capabilities.
To be specific, since linear operations of CNNs over input data and random noise are
linearly separable, decryption of noise can be conveniently computed offline. In prac-
tical CNN architectures such as AlexNet and FaceNet, linear operations are dominant
due to their vast number. Therefore, it is rewarding to trade offline computation and
storage (of random noise) for online computation to assure the real-time performance
of CNN inference tasks. Thanks to the online/offline encryption, IoT devices are able
to securely offload over 99% CNN operations to edge devices. In addition, my scheme
does not introduce any accuracy loss as compared to CNN inferences over unencrypted
data, because it does not utilize any approximation for all required operations. In order
to detect dishonest behaviors of edge devices, I design an integrity check mechanism
as a pluggable module to help the IoT devices detect incorrect returned results from
edge devices with a success rate over 99%. Minor computation overhead (1.1% drop
of offload percentage in worst case) is introduced when this integrity check module is
plugged. It is also worth to note that my scheme can be customized to support flexible
CNN architectures that fulfill the requirements of different applications.
To further boost the efficiency of my scheme, two more pluggable modules can be in-
tegrated to enhance the performance in terms of convolution efficiency and communi-
cation cost reduction. Convolution operation, which generates the major computation
consumption in a CNN model, consists of multiplications mostly. I investigate the fast
convolution algorithm in [96] and integrate it to speed up the convolution cost by 26.89×
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for AlexNet. I also leverage the fast and efficient floating-point data compression algo-
rithm in [97] and utilize it to reduce my communication cost by over 72% in AlexNet
and FaceNet.
5.2 Related Work
The problem of privacy-preserving deep learning based image analysis has been studied
in recent years under the cloud computing environment [36–44]. These works focus on
the “machine learning as a service” scenario, wherein the cloud server has a trained neu-
ral network model and users submitted encrypted data for predication. One recent line
of research uses somewhat or fully homomorphic encryption (HE) to evaluate the neural
network model over encrypted inputs after approximating non-linear layers in the neural
network [36–38]. Combining multiple secure computation techniques (e.g., HE, Secure
multi-party computation (MPC), oblivious transfer (OT)) is another trend to support
privacy-preserving neural network inference [39, 41, 42, 44]. The idea behind these
mixed protocols is to evaluate scalar products using HE and non-linear activation func-
tions using MPC techniques. In particular, SecureML [39] utilized the mixed-protocol
framework proposed in ABY [42], which involves arithmetic sharing, boolean sharing,
and Yao’s garbled circuits, to implement both privacy-preserving training and inference
in a two-party computation setting. In [44], MiniONN is proposed to support privacy-
preserving inference by transforming neural networks to the corresponding oblivious
version with the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SMID) batch technique. Trusted
third-party is invoked in Chameleon [43] and hence greatly reducing the computation
and bandwidth cost for a privacy-preserving inference. In [41] GAZELLE is proposed
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by leveraging lattice-based packed additive homomorphic encryption (PAHE) and two-
party secure computation techniques. GAZELLE deploys PAHE in an automorphism
manner to achieve fast matrix multiplication/convolution and thus boosting the final
run-time efficiency. A multi-sever solution, named SecureNN, is proposed in [40], which
greatly improves the privacy-preserving inference performance, i.e., 42.4× faster than
MiniONN [44], and 27×, 3.68× faster than Chameleon [43] and GAZELLE [41].
While the performance of evaluating neural network over encrypted data for image
analysis keeps being improved, the existing research works only focus on small-scale
neural networks. Taking the state-of-the-art SecureNN [40] as an example, the network-
A evaluated (also used by [39]) only requires about 1.2 million FLOPs for an inference,
which costs 3.1s with wireless communication in their 3PC setting. As a comparison, the
AlexNet evaluated in my scheme contains 2.27 billion FLOPs for one inference, which
costs 3.508s in my scheme with similar wireless transmission speed. It is also worth to
note that SecureNN utilizes powerful cloud server (36 vCPU, 132 ECU, 60GB memory)
for evaluation, whereas the edge computing device in this paper is just a regular laptop
computer. Scaling up the network size is not a trivial task. For example, compared
with the type-A network in [41], its type-C network with 500× multiplication increases
the computational cost and communication cost to 430× and 592×. Therefore, how to
support real-time execution of complex CNN inference tasks over encrypted IoT data
remains as an open problem.
5.3 Preliminaries - Convolutional Neural Network
A CNN contains a stack of layers that transform input data to outputs with label
scores. There are four types of most common layers in CNN architectures, including:
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Convolutional Layers, Pooling Layers, Activation Layers, and Fully-connected Layers.
Convolutional layers extract features from input data. Fig.5.1 depicts an example of
convolutional layer that has an input data of size n× n×D and H kernels, each of size
k × k ×D. The input will be processed into all H kernels independently to extract H
different features. Considering the input and each kernel as D levels, where each level
of the input and kernel are a n× n matrix and a k × k matrix respectively. Each level
of a kernel starts scanning the corresponding input level from top-left corner, and then
moves from left to right with s elements, where s is the stride of the convolutional layer.
Once the top-right corner is reached, the kernel moves s elements downward and scans
from left to right again. This convolution process is repeated until the kernel reaches the
bottom-right corner of this input level. For each scan, an output is computed using the
dot product between the scanned window of input and the kernel as an example shown
in Fig.5.1. For each kernel, the output for all D levels will be summed together.
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Figure 5.1: Examples of a Convolutional Layer and a Fully-connected Layer
Pooling layers and activation layers are usually non-linear layers. A pooling layer is pe-
riodically inserted between convolutional layers. Pooling layers progressively reduce the
spatial size of outputs from convolutional layers, and thus to make data robust against
noise and control overfitting. An activation layer utilizes element-wise activation func-
tions to signal distinct identification of their input data. There are a number of popular
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pooling strategies (e.g., max-pooling and average-pooling) and activation functions (e.g.,
rectified linear units (ReLUs) and continuous trigger functions), which are extremely
computational efficient compared with convolutional layers and fully-connected layers.
In my scheme, these two efficient layers will be directly handled on the IoT devices.
Fully-connected layers are usually the final layers of a CNN to output the final results
of the network. In case of a fully-connected layer, all neurons in it have full connections
to all outputs from the previous layer. As an example shown in Fig.5.1, the connection
between each neuron and input element has a weight. To obtain the output of a neuron,
elements connected to it will be multiplied with their weights and then accumulated.
More details about CNN can be found in ref [98].
5.4 Privacy-preserving Compute-intense Layers
In my scheme, the user needs to offload compute-intense convolution and fully-connected
layer to the edge device. For the purpose of privacy protection, the offloaded data is
encrypted. To enable accurate and efficient convolution/fully-connected layer execution
over encrypted data, I design privacy-preserving convolution layer (PPCL) module and
privacy-preserving fully-connected layer (PPFL) module respectively. Before I dive into
the details of my modules. I summarize important notation in Table 5.1.
5.4.1 PPCL: Privacy-preserving Convolutional Layer
In PPCL, I consider a general convolutional layer with a n × n ×D input, stride as s,
padding as p, and H kernels with each size of k × k ×D. The dth level of the input is
denoted as a m×m matrix Id.
Chapter 5. Privacy Protection for Deep Learning Based Image Analysis 67
Table 5.1: Summary of Notations
n× n the size of each level of a convolutional layer’s
input
D
the depth of the input of a convolutional layer
and kernel
k × k the size of a convolutional layer’s kernel matrix
H the number of kernels of a convolutional layer
s the size of stride used for a convolutional layer
p the size of padding used for a convolutional layer
Rc,d n× n random matrices to encrypt the input of a
1 ≤ d ≤ D convolutional layer
αi (
n−k+2p
s + 1)× (
n−k+2p
s + 1) matrices to decrypt
1 ≤ i ≤ H a convolutional layer’s output from H kernels
m the size of a fully-connected layer input vector
T the number of neurons of a fully-connected layer
Rf
a m-dimensional random vector to encrypt the
input of a fully-connected layer
β
a T -dimensional decryption vector to decrypt
fully-connected layer outputs
Input Encryption: The IoT device encrypts the input using the pre-stored keys {Rc,d}
for this convolutional layer as
Enc(Id) = Id +Rc,d (5.1)
where {Enc(Id)}, 1 ≤ d ≤ D are sent to the edge device.
Privacy-preserving Execution: The edge device takes each Enc(Id), 1 ≤ d ≤ D as
the input of kernels to perform the convolution process. For the ith kernel, the edge
device outputs
D∑
d=1
Conv(Enc(Id), ith) (5.2)
=
D∑
d=1
Conv(Id, ith) +
D∑
d=1
Conv(Rc,d, ith)
∑D
d=1 Conv(Enc(Id), ith), 1 ≤ i ≤ H are returned back to the IoT device as intermediate
results.
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Decryption and Preparation for the Next Layer: Given the returned∑D
d=1 Conv(Enc(Id), ith), 1 ≤ i ≤ H, the IoT device quickly decrypts them as
D∑
d=1
Conv(Enc(Id), ith)− αi =
D∑
d=1
Conv(Id, ith) (5.3)
where {αi =
∑D
d=1 Conv(Rc,d, ith)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ H are the pre-stored decryption keys for
this layer. Afterwards, the IoT device performs the activation layer and pooling layer
directly over convolutional output, which are extremely compute-efficient. For example,
one of the most popular activation layer ReLU only requires translating negative values
in the input to 0. The popular max-pooling (or average-pooling) layer simply shrinks
the data by taking the max value (or average value respectively) every few values.
The output will be encrypted and sent to the edge device using PPCL for the next
convolutional layer (or PPFL respectively for a fully-connected layer).
5.4.2 PPFL: Privacy-preserving Fully-connected Layer
In PPFL, I consider a general fully-connected layer with T neurons and takes a m-
dimensional vector V as input.
Input Encryption: Given the input, the IoT device encrypts it using the pre-stored
encryption key Rf for this layer as
Enc(V) = V +Rf (5.4)
Enc(V) is then sent to the edge device.
Privacy-preserving Execution: On receiving Enc(V), the edge device takes Enc(V)
as the input of the fully-connected layer. Specifically, the encrypted outcome Enc(O[j]),
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1 ≤ j ≤ T of each neuron is computed as
Enc(O[j]) =
m∑
i=1
Enc(V)[i]× wi,j = O[j] + β[j] (5.5)
where wi,j is the weight between the ith element of input vector and the jth neuron.
Enc(O) = {Enc(O[1]), Enc(O[2]), · · · ,
Enc(O[T ])} is sent back to the IoT device as intermediate results.
Decryption and Preparation for the Next Layer: Given the returned Enc(O),
the IoT device decrypts each Enc(O) with the pre-stored decryption key β of this layer
as
O = Enc(O)− β (5.6)
Then, the IoT device executes the activation layer with O as input. The output from
the activation layer will be encrypted and sent to edge device using PPFL if there are
any additional fully-connected layers in the CNN.
5.5 Edge-Assisted CNN Inference over Encrypted Imagery
Data
In this section, I demonstrate the practical application of my PPCL and PPFL module
in an edge-assisted IoT image analysis task. To assure the real-time performance of the
image analysis tasks, I use a novel online/offline strategy to design my scheme. The
online phase refers to the duration when a CNN inference is being executed for the
data collected by an IoT device. The offline phase refers to the “no-inference” status
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of the IoT device and time before the IoT device is deployed. Specifically, the owner of
an IoT device pre-computes multiple sets of encryption and decryption keys during the
offline phase and loads them into the IoT device. In the online phase, the IoT device
uses these pre-computed keys to efficiently encrypt data to be offloaded and decrypt
results returned by the edge device. In my system, the IoT device offloads expensive
convolutional layers and fully-connected layers to the edge device, and only keeps the
compute-efficient layers at local. This is motivated by the fact that convolutional and
fully-connected layers occupy majority of computation and parameters storage in typical
CNNs [99]. All CNN operations performed by the edge device are over encrypted imagery
data.
5.5.1 Offline Phase
In the offline phase, the user generates encryption and decryption keys for all convo-
lutional layers and fully-connected layers in a trained CNN. I consider each element in
the input image matrix of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers is γ-bit long,
and λ is the security parameter. To ensure the security 1
2λ−γ−1
shall be a negligible
value in terms of computational secrecy [100], e.g., < 1
2128
. Detailed selection of security
parameter is discussed in Section 6.1.1.
As described in Algorithm.2, given a convolutional layer with a n×n×D input, stride as
s, padding as p, and H kernels (k× k matrices), the owner generates {Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D}
as the encryption keys and {αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ H} as its decryption keys, where Rc,d is a n×n
random matrix and αi is a (
n−k+2p
s +1)×(
n−k+2p
s +1) matrix. For expression simplicity,
I use Conv(Rc,d, ith) to denote the convolution operation for the ith kernel with Rc,d as
input.
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Given a fully-connected layer with a m-dimensional vector as input and T neurons, the
owner first generates a m-dimensional random vector Rf . Then, the owner takes Rf as
the input of the fully-connected layer to output a T -dimensional vector β. Rf and β are
set as the encryption key and decryption key respectively for this layer.
For a CNN with x convolutional layers and y fully-connected layers, x sets of
{Rc,d, αi}1≤d≤Dx,1≤i≤Hx and y sets of {Rf , β} are generated by the owner as a final set
of keys {Enckey, Deckey}. Note that , each set of keys is only valid for one CNN request
in the later online phase. Thus, the owner will generate multiple sets of keys according
to the necessity of application scenarios as discussed in Section 5.6.
Input : Input size n× n×D, stride s, padding p, H kernels
Output: Encryption keys Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D, Decryption keys αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ H
Generate random n× n matrices Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D ;
for 1 ≤ i ≤ H do
for 1 ≤ d ≤ D do
Take Rc,d as input for the ith kernel for convolution and output Conv(Rc,d, ith);
d++;
end
Set αi =
∑D
d=1 Conv(Rc,d, ith);
i+ +;
end
Algorithm 2: Offline Preparation of Convolutional Layer
Input : Input Data & Trained CNN
Output: CNN Execution Result
Set the Layer Input M = Input Data;
Set Layers = the collection of all Convolutional Layers and Fully-connected Layers in CNN;
Set Layer = the first Layer from Layers;
while Layer is not null do
if Layer = Convolutional Layer then
Execute the PPCL with M as input.;
Set M = output from PPCL;
end
if Layer = Fully-connected Layer then
Execute the PPFL with M as input.
Set M = output from PPFL;
end
Set Layer = Layers.next();
end
return M as result;
Algorithm 3: Online CNN Inference
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5.5.2 Online Phase
During the online phase, the IoT device can efficiently interact with the edge device to
conduct CNN inference over encrypted data. The overall process of my online phase is
depicted in Algorithm.3. Specifically, the IoT device offloads encrypted data to the edge
device for performing compute-intense convolutional layers and fully-connected layers.
Intermediate results are returned back to the IoT device for decryption. Then, these
decrypted results are processed with the follow up activation layer and pooling layer (if
exists). Outputs are encrypted and offloaded again if the next layer is a convolutional
layer or a fully-connected layer. This procedure is conducted iteratively until all CNN
layers are executed.
To fulfill these tasks, I apply PPCL and PPFL to enable the IoT device to efficiently
handle each layer in a CNN. Compute-intense convolutional and fully-connected layers
are securely offloaded to the edge using PPCL and PPFL. Since I develop PPCL and
PPFL as independent modules, they can be customized and recursively plugged into
any CNN no matter how many different convolutional layers and fully-connected layers
it contains.
5.6 Discussion - Storage and Update of Pre-computed Keys
Our scheme considers two major types of resource-constrained IoT devices that run
CNN-driven applications.
• Type-1: Mobile IoT devices with limited battery life and computational capability,
such as drones.
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• Type-2: Static devices with power supply but has limited computational capability,
such as security cameras.
The type-1 devices are usually deployed to perform tasks for a period time. Therefore,
before each deployment, the device owner can pre-load enough keys to support its CNN
tasks. With regards to the type-2 devices, the owner can perform an initial key pre-
loading and then use remote update to securely add new offline keys as described in
Fig.5.2.
IoT Device Owner
2. New offline keys encrypted using the IoT device’s secret key (e.g., AES)
Edge Device
IoT Devices
3. Send encrypted keys 
during devices’ idle time
1. Initial Key 
Deployment
4. Decrypt Keys
Figure 5.2: Key Update for Power Connected Devices
Our scheme proposes to ensure the timely processing of CNN requests when they are
needed on IoT devices. Instead of performing real-time CNN requests on every piece of
data collected, resource-constrained IoT devices usually require in-depth analytics using
CNN when specific signals are detected. Taking real-time search and monitoring using
drones as an example application for type-1 devices, fast local processing will be first
performed for data collected to get estimated results [101]. Once suspicious signs are
detected in estimated results, CNN based analytics are further conducted for a small set
of data (e.g., video frames with the detected suspicious object). Given the high efficiency
of my scheme, the performance of such CNN requests will be timely supported when
enough pre-computed keys are available. For example, when the average frequency CNN
requests is every one per ten seconds for a drone, only 360 sets of pre-computed keys
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are needed for one-hour deployment, which is longer than most current drones’ battery
life [102]. Security camera is an example of type-2 devices, which requires CNN-based
analytics to extract detailed information only when alarm is triggered by motion or
audio sensors of the camera. Similar to the drone case, my scheme can timely support
the peak CNN requests when suspicious signs are detected.
Assuming the average frequency of CNN-required alarm in a security camera is one per
10 minutes, and each alarm requires 5 CNN requests, 720 sets of pre-computed keys
are needed for one-day usage. As evaluated in Section 6.1.2.3, an IoT device with a
32GB SD card is able to store enough keys to support 1600 requests for AlexNet. Such
a result indicates 4.4 deployments and a 2.22-day support for type-1 and type-2 devices
respectively when using AlexNet.
Note that, my scheme is designed for low-cost resource-constrained devices that require
timely processing of moderate (or low) frequent CNN requests. For application scenarios
that involve a large number of constant CNN requests, e.g., security critical surveillance
systems, computational powerful devices are suggested to handle CNN requests directly
at local.
5.7 Discussion - Offloading Pooling Layers
While pooling layers are usually compute-efficient in a CNN, they can also be securely
offloaded to edge devices using my online/offline strategy to further promote the effi-
ciency. Particularly, I focus on the offloading of average pooling layer as the example
shown in Fig.5.3, which performs down-sampling by dividing the input into rectangular
pooling regions and computing the average values of each region. Given a n × n × D
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matrix as input to an average pooling layer with q × q pooling regions and s as stride,
a (n−qs + 1)× (
n−q
s + 1) matrix is generated as output.
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Figure 5.3: Example of Pooling Layers
To enable the offloading of an average pooling layer, the following changes will be made
for the offline phase and online phase:
• Offline Phase : For each use of the average pooling layer, the IoT device owner
generates D random matrices {Rp,d} with each size of n×n, and processes it with
the average pooling layer to obtain (n−qs + 1) × (
n−q
s + 1) matrices {Rc,d}. The
owner then runs Algorithm.2 using {Rc,d} as encryption keys to generate {αi}.
• Online Phase : The online offloading of an average pooling layer can be combined
with its follow up convolutional layer. Specifically, the IoT device encrypts each
level of input Id for the average pooling layer as Enc(Id) = Id +Rp,d, and sends
Enc(Id) to the edge device. The edge processes the pooling layer with Enc(Id)
as input and output Enc(Op,d). Then, the edge executes the convolutional layer
with {Enc(Op,d)}1≤d≤D as input and outputs Enc(Oi), 1 ≤ i ≤ H for H kernels.
Finally, the IoT device can decrypt {Enc(Oi)} using {αi} as Oi = Enc(Oi) −
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ H.
It is worth to note that my design combines the offloading of the average pooling layer
and its follow up convolutional layer. Thus, the IoT device only needs to encrypt the in-
put of pooling layer and decrypt the outputs from the convolutional layers using efficient
Chapter 5. Privacy Protection for Deep Learning Based Image Analysis 76
matrix additions.
I now analyze the correctness for offloading average-pooling layer and convolutional layer
together. By denoting the average-pooling operation as AvgP (·), I have the fact that
AvgP (Enc(Id)) = AvgP (Id) +AvgP (Rp,d)
In addition, according to the correctness of PPCL as discussed in Section 5.4.1, I have
D∑
d=1
(Convi(AvgP (Id) +AvgP (Rp,d)))
=
D∑
d=1
Convi(AvgP (Id)) +
D∑
d=1
Convi(AvgP (Rp,d))
where Convi(·) is the processing of ith kernel in the convolutional layer. Since αi =∑D
d=1Conv(AvgP (Rp,d)), I get
Oi = Enc(Oi)− αi =
D∑
d=1
Convi(AvgP (Id)), 1 ≤ i ≤ H (5.7)
Therefore, after the decryption, the IoT device can obtain the correct output for the
average-pooling layer and convolutional layer.
5.8 Enhancement - Integrity Check
Due to the heavy computation and storage overhead brought by convolutional and fully-
connected layers, untrusted edge devices may perform dishonest behaviors so that they
can save their resource utilities. After receiving inference requests from the IoT devices,
the edge devices may cheat the IoT devices by skipping the heavy convolutional op-
erations and sending back random, apparently not correct, results to the IoT devices.
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These incorrect results can badly effect or even completely ruin the final result of the
entire CNN inference. In order to ensure the integrity of returned data from edge de-
vices, my scheme also provides an optional integrity check functionality with only a
minor efficiency cost. By enabling the integrity check, the IoT device can achieve an
error detection rate of 99% while only losing 1.1% in offload percentage in the worst
case compared with integrity check plugged in. The users can decide whether to turn
on this functionality based on the actual deployment scenario and the trustworthiness
of the edge devices.
The basic strategy of integrity check is to first sample a small portion of elements from
returned data in each layer and then check whether there is an incorrect result occurring
in the selected elements. To validate the correctness of a single element, the IoT device
needs to go through the corresponded convolution operations locally. Although resource
consuming, with high probability, this validation process can block IoT devices from
taking incorrect results into next layer.
The error detection rate Pr(ED) can be calculated as below:
Pr(ED) = 1−
((1−θ)N
rN
)(
N
rN
) (5.8)
where N , r and θ is the size, sample rate and error rate of returned data in a con-
volutional layer.
((1−θ)N
rN
)
is the combination operation for selecting r × N elements
from (1− θ)×N elements. In order to increase the error detection rate while lowering
the additional validation computation on IoT device, I provide detailed evaluation by
performing numerical analysis and practical experiments in Section 5.8 and Section 6.2
respectively. Based on my experiment results on AlexNet, my scheme with integrity
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check turned on could achieve over 99% error detection rate while maintaining a similar
computation offload rate compared with unplugging integrity check.
5.9 Enhancement - Fast Convolution
In order to improve the efficiency of the compute-intense convolutional layer, I investigate
and integrate the fast convolution algorithm in [96]. Given matrix In×n as convolutional
layer input in one channel and matrix Kk×k as one filter of that convolutional layer, an
original convolution filtering Conv(I,K) requires (n− k + 1)2k2 element-wise multipli-
cation (set stride = 1 and padding = 0 for simplification). Take n = 4, k = 3 as an
example, the convolutional layer output is a 2 × 2 matrix. An original convolutional
computation would cost (n − k + 1)2k2 = 22 × 32 = 36 multiplications. The multipli-
cation number can be minimized by applying the fast filtering algorithm in [96, 103] to
transform Conv(·) into:
Conv(I,K) =
[
AT
[
[GKGT ] [BTIB]
]
A
]T
(5.9)
where  represents element-wise multiplication and:
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BT =

1 0 −1 0
0 1 1 0
0 −1 1 0
0 1 0 −1

G =

1 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 −
1
2
1
2
0 0 1

AT =
1 1 1 0
0 1 −1 −1

K =

g0 g1 g2
g3 g4 g5
g6 g7 g8

T
I =

d0 d1 d2 d3
d4 d5 d6 d7
d8 d9 d10 d11
d12 d13 d14 d15

T
(5.10)
in which B, G and A are auxiliary coefficient matrices. Details of generating these ma-
trices are stated in [103]. It can be easily proved that Equation 5.12 achieves equilibrium
by applying values from Equation 5.10. Note that under my scenario, the trained CNN
does not require frequent update and GKGT can be precomputed once the CNN is de-
ployed on the edge servers. Moreover, operations with A and B involved are considered
as additions instead of multiplications because both A and B are composed of 0, 1 and
-1. Thus, the total number of multiplications |[GKGT ] [BTIB]| = 16 is calculated by
counting the participating elements in the element-wise multiplication.
To be more generic, according to the 1-D minimal filtering algorithm in [103, 104],
computing m-dimension outputs with an r-dimension filter, denoted as F (m, r), requires
µ(F (m, r)) = m+ r−1 multiplications. By nesting this 1-D algorithm with itself, a 2-D
version can be achieved as µ(F (m×m, r× r)) = µ(F (m, r))× µ(F (m, r)). Thus, in my
scenario, during a convolution filtering, the minimal number of multiplications required
for computing (n− k + 1)× (n− k + 1) outputs with k × k filter can be derived as:
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µ(F ((n− k + 1)2, k2)) = µ(F (n− k + 1, k))2
= (n− k + 1 + k − 1)2
= n2
(5.11)
This is also consistent with the above example where n = 4, k = 3 and the overall
number of multiplications is 16. In my model, the plaintext input Id, key Rc,d and
encrypted input Id + Rc,d share the same size and since all the operations in the fast
filtering algorithm are linear operations, my scheme can perfectly enhance its efficiency
by applying Id and Rc,d in Equation 5.12 and obtain:
Conv(Id +Rc,d,K)
=
[
AT
[
[GKGT ] [BT (Id +Rc,d)B]
]
A
]T
Conv(Rc,d,K) =
[
AT
[
[GKGT ] [BTRc,dB]
]
A
]T
(5.12)
By integrating the fast filtering algorithm, my scheme can reduce the multiplication
overhead by ( (n−2p+k)ksn )
2 times in each convolutional layer. And since the fast filtering
algorithm can yield exactly the same result as the original convolution, there is no
accuracy loss introduced.
5.10 Enhancement - Matrix Compression
In order to save communication overhead in my design, I investigate and integrate the
well-known fast and efficient float data compression [97] before transmitting data be-
tween edge devices and IoTs. [97] proposed an efficient compressor for both 32-bit and
64-bit images. by placing emphasis on both 2D and 3D data for rendering. The compres-
sion algorithm leverages the Lorenzo predictor [105] to predict the data and meanwhile,
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it also utilizes a Schindler’s quasistatic probability model [106] based range coder to
encode the residual. Details of the fast and efficient float data compression is stated in
[97].
5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, I proposed a novel online/offline scheme that enables resource-
constrained IoT devices to efficiently execute CNN requests with privacy protection.
My scheme uniquely designs a lightweight online/offline encryption scheme to provide
private, efficient and accurate offloading of CNN inference tasks. By discovering the
fact that linear operations in CNNs over input and random noise can be separated, my
scheme pre-computes decryption keys to remove random noises and thus boosting the
performance of real-time CNN requests. By integrating local edge devices, my scheme
ameliorates the network latency and service availability issue. My scheme also makes
the privacy-preserving operation over encrypted data on the edge device as efficient
as that over unencrypted data. Moreover, the privacy protection in my scheme does
not introduce any accuracy loss to the CNN inference. In addition, I design a few
enhancement modules to bring more features and improve the performance of my scheme
in terms of efficiency and data integrity protection. In the next chapter, I will analyze the
security and performance of my design followed by experiment results on my prototype
implementation.
Chapter 6
Evaluation of Privacy Protection
Modules for Deep Learning Based
Image Analysis
In this chapter, I first theoretically audit the security and performance of my design in
my application scenario. Then I provide experimental results to evaluate the practical
performance of my privacy protection modules as well as their enhancement for deep
learning based image analysis stated in Chapter 5.
6.1 Security and Performance Analysis
6.1.1 Security Analysis
In this section, I first prove the security of my online/offline encrypted used in PPCL
and PPFL, and then show the security of the overall CNN inference in my setting as
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described in Chapter 2 Section 2.
Theorem 6.1. Given the ciphertext C of a γ-bit random message M generated using
PPCL or PPFL, the probability for a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
to output a correct guess for M shall have
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C]− Pr[M∗ =M] ≤ ε (6.1)
where ε is a negligible value in terms of computational secrecy [100], M∗ is A’s guess
for M, and Pr[M∗ = M] is the probability A makes a correct without ciphertext.
Specifically, the corresponding ciphertext generated using PPCL or PPFL only introduces
negligible additional advantages to A for making a correct guess of M.
Proof. Given an input matrix Id in PPCL (input vector V in PPFL respectively), each
γ-bit element (M) is encrypted by adding a λ-bit random number from uniform distri-
bution (denoted as R) as shown in Eq.5.1 and Eq.5.4.
To make a correct guess of M without the ciphertext, the adversary A has Pr[M∗ =
M] = 12γ , where M
∗ is A’s guess for M. By given the ciphertext C = M + R, C ∈
[0, 2γ + 2λ] there are two cases according to the value of C
1. 2γ ≤ C ≤ 2λ. In this case, I have Pr[M∗ = M] = 12γ , since C has the uniform
looking as R in the range of [2γ , 2λ].
2. C < 2γ or C > 2λ. In this case, I have Pr[M∗ =M] = 1C or Pr[M
∗ =M] = 1C−2λ ,
where Pr[M∗ =M] > 12γ This is because the distribution of C is affected by M
and the total possible inputs are now reduced to C or C − 2λ.
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The second case can happen when R < 2γ or R > 2λ − 2γ . As Pr[R < 2γ ] = Pr[R >
2λ − 2γ ] = 2γ
2λ
, I have
Pr[R < 2γ or R > 2λ − 2γ ] = Pr[R < 2γ ] + Pr[R > 2λ − 2γ ] = 1
2λ−γ−1
Thus, to guarantee 1
2λ−γ−1
is a negligible probability, such as 1
2128
, my scheme can set the
security parameter λ according to size of input message, i.e., λ− γ− 1 > 128. I now use
ε = 1
2λ−γ−1
to denote the negligible probability, and get the probability Pr[(M∗ =M)|C]
as
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C] ≤ 1
2γ
∗ (1− ε) + 1 ∗ ε = 1
2γ
+ (1− 1
2γ
)ε
where 12γ ∗ (1 − ε) is the probability for a correct guess for 2
γ ≤ C ≤ 2λ, and the “1”
in 1 ∗ ε is best probability for a correct guess A can have when C < 2γ or C > 2λ. As a
result, I get
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C]− Pr[M∗ =M] ≤ (1− 1
2γ
)ε < ε
As ε is negligible value, Theorem 6.1 is proved.
I now discuss the security of the overall CNN inference. Without loss of generality, I use
layer-x to denote a convolutional layer or a fully-connected layer needs to be offloaded,
Ix and Ox are the input and output of layer-x. With regards to the offloading of
layer-x, Ix is encrypted using my online/offline encryption, which has been proved to
be secure as shown in Theorem 6.1. When moving to the next layer, i.e., layer-(x+1),
Ox is processed through non-linear layers by the IoT device to generate the input of
layer-(x+1) as I(x+1). Before being offloaded, each element M in I(x+1) is encrypted
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by adding a random number R from uniform distribution. By selecting an appropriate
security parameter λ, there will be only a negligible probability 1
2λ−γ−1
that M affects
the uniform looking of ciphertextM+R as proved in Theorem 6.1, where γ is the length
of M in bits. To be specific, by re-encrypting the input of each offloaded layer in my
scheme, the negligible additional advantages introduced by each offloaded layer for the
adversary to learn its input and output will not be accumulated for later layers in the
CNN inference. Therefore, the security of the overall CNN inference is achieved in my
scheme with proper selection of λ.
6.1.2 Numerical Analysis
The numerical analysis of my scheme is summarized in Table 6.1. For expression simplic-
ity, I use one floating point operation (FLOP) to denote an addition or a multiplication.
I use an AlexNet [46] model as the study case for analysis.
6.1.2.1 Computational Cost
In the Online phase, the IoT device offloads compute-intense convolutional layers and
fully-connected layers to the edge devices. Given a general convolutional layer, the IoT
device only needs to perform D matrix addition with Dn2 FLOPs for encryption and
H(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 FLOPs for decryption respectively. Compared with executing the same
convolutional layer fully on the IoT device, which takes 2DHk2(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 FLOPs,
my scheme significantly reduces real-time computation on the IoT device. It is worth
to note that the stride s in a convolutional layer is typically a small value (e.g., 1 or
2). For a general fully-connected layer, the IoT device needs to perform m FLOPs for
encryption and T FLOPs for decryption as shown in Eq.5.4 and Eq.5.6 respectively.
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Table 6.1: Numerical Analysis Summary
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In this table: s is the stride, p is the size of padding, H is the number of kernels,
k × k is the size of kernels of a convolutional layer; T is the number of neurons of a
fully-connected layer. Each element is 20 Bytes.
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Differently, if the IoT device executes such a fully-connected layer at local, 2mT FLOPs
are needed.
Besides the offloading of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers, the IoT de-
vice also needs to process non-linear layers locally. These non-linear layers are highly
compute-efficient. Taking the widely adopted activation layer - ReLU as an example,
it only requires 1
2Dk2
of its previous convolutional layer’s cost or 12m of its previous
fully-connected layer’s cost.
I now discuss the computational cost of my scheme using AlexNet and FaceNet. As
shown in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, my scheme can offload over 99.9% computational
cost for convolutional layers and fully-connected layers in both models, and only leaves
lightweight encryption and decryption on the IoT device. Compared with the offloaded
convolutional layers and fully-connected layers, the local execution of all non-linear lay-
ers only requires 0.08% operations for AlexNet and 0.50% operations for FaceNet. This
result further affirms my motivation to offload convolutional layers and fully-connected
layers. Meanwhile, as FaceNet requires more computation (additional 0.9 billion FLOPs)
in compute-intense layers compared with AlexNet, I observe that the offloaded compu-
tation ratio maintains over 99%. This observation supports that my scheme is able to
be scaled up and reduce the local computation cost of IoT devices when dealing with
more complex deep learning models.
With regards to the encrypted execution on the edge device, my scheme achieves the
same computational cost as that directly using unencrypted data as shown in Table 6.1.
This is because my encryption (Eq.5.1 and Eq.5.4) in PPCL and PPFL schemes make
the ciphertexts Enc(Id) and Enc(V) remain the same dimension as their plaintexts Id
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Table 6.2: Example Numerical Analysis on AlexNet
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Table 6.3: Example Numerical Analysis on FaceNet
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and V. Such a decent property guarantees real-time computational performance on the
edge device.
In the Offline phase, the IoT device owner first prepares encryption keys by choosing ran-
dom matrices for convolutional layers and fully-connected layers that will be offloaded.
Meanwhile, the owner will take these encryption keys as inputs for their corresponding
convolutional layers or fully-connected layers to obtain results as the decryption keys.
In Section 6.2, I show that the offline phase can be efficiently executed using a regular
laptop.
6.1.2.2 Communication Cost
The communication cost of my scheme comes from the transmission of encrypted inputs
and outputs of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers. In my implementation,
I use 160-bit random numbers (i.e., λ = 160) during all encryption processes in Eq.5.1
and Eq.5.4. Thus, each element in the ciphertext (a matrix or a vector) is 20-Byte long.
To offload a convolutional layer with a n × n × D input, the IoT device first sends its
corresponding ciphertext contains D encrypted matrices with Dn2 elements in total.
Then, H encrypted result matrices are received from the edge device with each size of
(n−k+2ps +1)×(
n−k+2p
s +1). With regards to the offloading of a fully-connected layer that
takes a m-dimensional vector as input, the IoT device needs to send a m-dimensional
vector as encrypted input and receive a T -dimensional vector as encrypted output from
the edge device. As shown in Table 6.2, the communication cost for an offloading of
the AlexNet is 20.49MB, which can be efficiently handled under the edge computing
environment [107].
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6.1.2.3 Storage Overhead
For the offloading of a convolutional layer with a n × n × D input, the IoT device
needs to store D random matrices with n2 elements each as the encryption keys, and
H matrices with size of (n−k+2ps + 1)× (
n−k+2p
s + 1) as the decryption keys. To offload
a fully-connected layer with a m-dimensional vector as input, a m-dimensional vector
and a T -dimensional vector need to be pre-stored as the encryption key and decryption
key respectively. Table 6.2 shows the offloading of an AlexNet request needs 20.49MB
storage overhead. With the rise of IoT devices, low-power-consumption SD memory
card has become an excellent fit to economically extend the storage of IoT devices [108],
which usually have more than 32GB capacity. As discussed in Section 5.6, IoT devices
deployed for one-time tasks can easily pre-load enough keys with a SD card. Meanwhile,
remote key update can be adopted long-term deployment.
In this Table 6.4, s is the stride, p is the size of padding, H is the number of kernels,
k × k is the size of kernels of a convolutional layer; θ is the error rate of the returned
data; r is the sample rate of the returned data. Each element is 20 Bytes.
6.1.2.4 Resource Consumption of Integrity Check
Turning on the integrity check leads to additional resource consumption to local IoT
device. As shown in Table 6.4, given a returned matrix of size H(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 and
a sample rate of r, the validation process in Section 5.8 brings drH(n−k+2ps + 1)
2e
additional computation and makes the total computational cost of IoT devices rise to
2Dk2drH(n−k+2ps +1)
2e. Since any convolutional result in the entire set of response map
can be incorrect, IoT devices need to store all kernel parameters of each convolutional
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Table 6.4: Numerical Analysis of Integrity Check
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Table 6.5: Example Comparison with/without Integrity Check
Computation of IoT (FLOPs) Offloaded Percentage
No Integrity Integrity No Integrity Integrity
Check Check Check Check
Conv-1 444,987 866,793 99.79% 99.59%
Conv-2 256,608 2,944,608 99.97% 99.67%
Conv-3 108,160 2,504,320 99.96% 99.16%
Conv-4 129,792 3,724,032 99.97% 99.17%
Conv-5 108,160 3,398,272 99.96% 98.86%
Communication Cost (KB) Storage Overhead (KB)
No Integrity Integrity No Integrity Integrity
Check Check Check Check
Conv-1 8691.15 8691.27 8691.15 8918.03
Conv-2 5011.88 5011.98 5011.88 5136.88
Conv-3 2112.50 2112.60 2112.50 2180.00
Conv-4 2535.00 2535.10 2535.00 2602.50
Conv-5 2112.50 2112.59 2112.50 2157.50
The results in this table is generated based on error rate θ = 1% and sample rate
r = 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0.8%, 1.1% for Conv-1 - Conv-5 respectively.
layer locally, which adds on Hk2 storage overhead and makes the total IoT storage
overhead to be Dn2 +H(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 +Hk2.
Table 6.5 shows the resource consumption comparison between integrity check plugged
in and plugged off. The results are calculated when error rate θ = 1% and sample rate
r = 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0.8%, 1.1% for Conv-1 - Conv-5 respectively. Under this setting,
IoT device can achieve 99%+ error detection rate in each convolutional layer. Since all
the multiplication results of rθ are less equal to 1.1×10−4, the additional communication
costs resulted from integrity check are tiny. As a result, the communication increments
are less than 4.74 × 10−3% of the original communication costs. Compared with the
heavy parameters in fully-connected layers, the parameters in convolutional layers only
stand for a minor portion of the entire neural network model. Thus, even the highest
additional storage overhead is only 227 KB while the lowest increment can be as low as
45 KB.
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6.1.2.5 Analysis of Fast Convolution
In this section, I analyze the performance improvement introduced by the fast filter-
ing algorithm. I scrutinize the multiplication number of each convolutional layer in
both AlexNet and FaceNet to demonstrate that fast filtering algorithm could enhance
convolution efficiency under different models.
From Table 6.6 I observe that the second convolutional layer in AlexNet achieves a
highest multiplication speedup rate of 26.89×. That’s because its filters are with a
small size of 5× 5, which is a perfect use case for fast filtering algorithm as indicated by
[96]. Moreover, the outputs of that layer shrink a lot in size compared with its inputs.
The first convolutional layer does not achieve a similar high speedup rate due to its
bigger filters and so do the last two convolutional layers since they lack notable shrink
in the output size.
Regarding FaceNet, I perform analysis for both categories where the first category in-
cludes all 11 convolutional layers while the second one does not apply layers whose filter
sizes are 1 × 1 (in other words, a-suffix layers). Table 6.7 indicates that convolution
in these a-suffix layers with 1 × 1 filters is indeed element-wise multiplication. Con-
sidering the nature of fast filtering algorithm stated in Section 5.9, speeding up such
element-wise multiplication is unrealistic under my settings. Thus it is understandable
that the speedup rate for the a-suffix layer is 1×, which also explains the reason that
first category’s speedup rate is about 1.5× lower than the second category’s. The cases
of AlexNet and FaceNet both demonstrate that the fast filtering algorithm can boost
the performance of my design in terms of convolution efficiency.
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Table 6.6: Efficiency Enhancement Analysis on AlexNet
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Table 6.7: Efficiency Enhancement Analysis on FaceNet
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6.2 Evaluation
I implemented a prototype of my scheme using Python 2.7. In my implementation,
TensorFlow and Keras libraries are adopted to support CNNs. The resource-constrained
IoT device is a Raspberry Pi (Model A) with Raspbian Debian 7, which has 700 MHz
single-core processor, 256MB memory, and 32GB SD card storage. The edge device
and the IoT device owner is a Macbook Pro laptop with OS X 10.13.3, 3.1 GHz Intel
Core i7 processor, 16GB memory, and 512GB SSD. The IoT device and the edge device
are connected using WiFi in the same subnet. I use the well-known ImageNet [109] as
the dataset for the evaluation of AlexNet. The security parameter λ is set as 160 in
my implementation. I also implemented a privacy-preserving AlexNet using CryptoNets
[36] for comparison.
6.2.1 Efficiency - Offline Phase
To generate the encryption and decryption keys for the execution of one AlexNet request,
my scheme only requires 114ms for the IoT device owner. While each set of keys will
only be used for one request, the owner can efficiently compute more than 2600 sets of
keys for AlexNet using 5 minutes.
6.2.2 Efficiency - Online Phase
I summarize the evaluation results of a real-time AlexNet inference task in Table 6.8.
Compared with executing the entire inference task on the IoT device, my scheme signifi-
cantly reduces execution time from 124.99s to 3.508s, which indicates a 35.63× speedup
rate. More importantly, with the increasing complexity of convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers, my scheme retains or increases the high speedup rate as shown in the
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Table 6.8: Experimental Evaluation Results on AlexNet
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Table 6.9: Comparison Between My Scheme and CryptonNets in First Convolutional
Layer of AlexNet
Our Scheme A-CryptoNets
(seconds) (seconds)
Encryption 0.012 459.93
Convolution 0.0103 625.86
Decryption 0.025 N/A
last column of Table 6.8. Taking AlexNet as an example, the highest speedup rates for
them are all achieved with these more complex layers. Therefore, my scheme is promis-
ing to be scaled up to support more complex CNN architectures according to practical
requirements.
It is noteworthy that the communication occupies 58.4% (2.049s/3.508s) cost of an
offloaded inference task in my scheme. In my implementation, I use a wireless network
with 10MB/s transmission speed between the IoT device and the edge device. In a real-
world scenario, the devices are likely to be connected via wired or cellular connection,
which allows a higher transmission speed than my experimental environment. Moreover,
the upcoming 5G era for MEC environment will significantly improve the transmission
speed [107] and further optimize the communication performance of my scheme.
To compare my scheme with homomorphic encryption-based solution [36] for CNN infer-
ence, I also implemented AlexNet using the CryptoNets scheme proposed in [36], denoted
as A-CryptoNets. During my implementation, I use the same linear approximation and
YASHE cryptosystem [110] as that in [36]. Table 6.9 shows the cost of processing the
first convolutional layer in my scheme and A-CryptoNets. Due to the large input size
required in AlexNet, A-CryptoNets requires 459.93s for encrypting the input data on
the IoT device, and 625.86s for the convolutional operations on the edge device. This
level of computational cost makes CryptoNets become hardly to satisfy time-sensitive
tasks with complex CNN inference. As a comparison, my scheme can handle the first
convolutional layer using 0.047s. Even considering the entire AlexNet inference task, my
scheme only requires 3.508s to complete.
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Table 6.10: Experimental Evaluation Results on Integrity Check
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I also provide evaluation on my proposed integrity check module. In Table 6.10 I observe
that even when the integrity check is plugged in, my scheme can still achieve a high
speedup rate of 30.00× compared with AlexNet local execution. This demonstrates the
practical usage of the utility of integrity check model. Users can opt whether to plug in
the module and achieve the ability of detecting dishonest behavior of edge devices with
a little efficiency trade-off.
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Table 6.11: Power and Energy Consumption Evaluation
IoT Local Executing Idle IoT Our Scheme
AlexNet without with Network IoT IoT
Network Connection Connection Computation Communication
Power (W) 0.81 0.78 1.17 1.42
Energy (J) 101.24 N/A 1.58 2.91
6.2.3 Energy Consumption
Compared with fully executing AlexNet inference tasks on the IoT device with high
energy consumption, my scheme significantly saves the energy consumption for compu-
tation of the IoT device while introducing slight extra energy consumption for commu-
nication. In my evaluation, the IoT device (Raspberry Pi Model A) is powered by a
5V micro-USB adapter. The voltage and current is measured using a Powerjive USB
multimeter [111] and the power is calculated by the multiplication of voltage and cur-
rent. Table 6.11 shows the average IoT power consumption under different IoT device
status. I observe that the network connection is a major power cost in IoT device. An
idle IoT device with network connection can have a comparable power cost (0.78W )
as executing AlexNet locally without network connection (0.81W ). This local AlexNet
execution power indicates an energy consumption of 101.24J when fully executing an
inference task on the IoT device in 124.99 seconds. Differently, my scheme reduces the
computation time on the IoT device to 1.353 seconds (1.59J energy consumption) with
2.049 seconds extra communication (2.90J energy consumption). Therefore, my scheme
can save IoT energy consumption by 101.24−(1.58+2.91)101.24 = 95.56%.
6.2.4 Accuracy
To validate that there is no accuracy loss in my scheme, I also implemented original
AlexNet without privacy protection as baseline. By using the same parameters, I achieve
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exact the same accuracy (80.1%) as that obtained using original AlexNet [46] without
privacy protection. On one hand, no approximation for non-linear layers is required in
my scheme. On the other hand, the random noise introduced in my encryption can be
perfectly eliminated during the decryption process.
6.2.5 Evaluation of Sample Rate in Integrity Check
In order to achieve a high error detection rate, different sample rate r needs to be
calculated based on different settings in each convolutional layer. As shown in Figure
6.1, to make the error detection rate to surpass 99%, Conv-1 - Conv-5 need to set r to
be 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0.8%, 1.1% respectively. Figure 6.2 shows that as the size of the
returned data rises, the sample rate r required to reach 99%+ error detection rate drops
correspondingly. From this observation combined with Figure 6.3, the scalability of the
integrity check feature is ensured and the additional resource consumption of a larger,
more complex CNN is always minor compared with its original costs.
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Figure 6.1: Evaluation of Sample Rate r and Error Detection Rate
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6.2.5.1 Evaluation of Matrix Compression
In order to evaluate the performance of the matrix compression module, I perform ex-
periments on both AlexNet and FaceNet to illustrate the integration of ZFP compression
can alleviate the communication cost in different models. From Table 6.12 and Table
6.13, it is clear that the communication cost of my scheme is reduced by 72%+ in both
models.
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Table 6.12: Communication Enhancement on AlexNet
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6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I give out detailed security analysis to show that my scheme is se-
cure with formal proof. By performing extensive numerical analysis as well as prototype
implementation over the well-known CNN architectures and datasets, I present the prac-
tical performance of my privacy-preserving compute-intense CNN layers along with a
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set of pluggable modules. Experiment results prove that my designed modules are able
to efficiently, accurately protect the privacy of deep learning based image analysis by
greatly tranfering the heavy computation burden from IoT devices to edge devices with
no accuracy loss in a privacy-preserving manner.
Chapter 7
Future Works and Conclusion
In this chapter, I discuss several future research tasks of this dissertation and then
conclude this dissertation.
7.1 Extension of Descriptor Based Image Analysis
As presented in Chapter 3, I design the privacy-preserving randomized k-d forest index
to improve the search efficiency my initial design CAPIA. However, the k-d tree as well
its derivatives have large construction cost in the setup stage, which makes them not
suitable for frequently updating datasets. To overcome this limitation, one possible
direction is to investigate data structures more fit to frequent dataset insertion (e.g.,
graphs, R-Tree [112], etc.). Then the challenge to be solved is how to incorporate the
potential data structure into image annotation task in a privacy-preserving manner.
Furthermore, in my privacy-preserving distance comparison design, the major type of
operations is matrix multiplication. I plan to convert matrix multiplications into simple
element multiplications, and then make them compatible with MapReduce [113], which
107
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is an extremely efficient model for the processing of a large number of simple operations
over big datasets. In addition, it’s also worth to migrate my design to other popular
imagery data analysis tasks such as image classification, object detection, information
retrieval etc.
7.2 Extension of Deep Learning Based Image Analysis
In Chapter 5, I present privacy-preserving convolution and fully connected layer along
with the novel online/offline strategy to enable efficient, accurate and private image
analysis using CNN. In my design, I offload the convolutional layer and fully connected
layer due to that their representation of heavy computation and storage overhead. A
possible next move can be targeted at securely offloading all the non-linear layer in the
CNN model. This can bring huge boost to the efficiency of CNN inference due to that
once both the linear and non-linear layers are offloaded, the communication between
IoT and edge device will be reduced to just two rounds. Instead of uploading encrypted
results after local execution of non-linear layer, the IoT device only needs to submit
the encrypted image matrix before the first layer and then just waits for the final infer-
ence results. In addition, as the flourishing of different deep learning models, I expect
to investigate other deep structures such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and
other recurrent neural networks, Regional Convolution Neural Network (RCNN) and its
follow-up regional CNNs, Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) and other adversarial
networks etc. Different privacy-preserving schemes should be designed to adapt unique
characteristics for these models. Moreover, recently, federated learning [114] got increas-
ing attraction in the field since it provides an efficient methodology to train deep learning
models among multiple registered ad-hoc imagery data contributors. Unlike traditional
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collaborative learning frameworks which need to upload imagery data to perform the
multi-party training, federated learning enables the participants to upload the weight
update after each local training epoch. This greatly reduces the communication cost
and alleviate the potential risk for information leakage from uploading the entire image.
However, even the weight update can still be compromise the privacy of user image if
attacked by a well trained GAN [115]. How to prevent image reconstruction or mem-
bership attack launched by GAN is an open challenge to traditional defense strategy in
traditional threat model definition.
7.3 A Privacy-preserving Hybrid Cloud-Edge Framework
for Image Analysis
Another promising research direction is regarding performing image analysis tasks on
mobile edge computing (MEC), and utilize MEC to overcome the limitation of high
network latency in cloud-assisted architectures. I first plan to utilize MEC to resolve
the “data drowning” issue in cloud-assisted architectures in the sense that not all the
imagery data collected by devices worth an in-depth analysis. For example, in video
data captured by a surveillance camera, only frames that contain suspect objects need
additional analytics on them. Therefore, I will utilize MEC to detect imagery data that
has a high potential to contain critical information, and only offload these critical data
to cloud for further analysis. Considering the third-party deployment nature of MEC,
I will design and develop privacy-preserving solutions for popular imagery data filtering
techniques, such as fast object detection, content-based sampling of video sequences, etc.
In addition, while cloud computing is a prevalent choice for the offloading of image anal-
ysis, I argue that many image analysis tasks can be completed directly using resources
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on MEC. For example, many CNN architectures can be handled efficiently by moderate
GPUs, which can be provided by MEC infrastructures. In my design, I will investigate
how to utilize computation resources of MEC to provide light-weight privacy-preserving
image analysis services. This design will be extremely suitable for time-sensitive imagery
analysis tasks (e.g., hazard detection, intelligence, and reconnaissance), since MEC is
typically within one-hop communication range with devices and is able to provide the
fastest response to them. Finally, I will integrate my designs for MEC and public cloud
as a coherent framework, which will provide privacy-preserving image analysis services in
a hybrid manner to fulfill the performance requirement of different application scenarios.
7.4 Conclusion
In this dissertation, I address the challenge of how to leverage the power of cloud/edge
server to perform efficient and accurate image analysis in a privacy-preserving manner.
I develop a generic methodology for imagery data analysis under different scenarios
and take efficiency, accuracy, as well as security into consideration at the same time. I
also evaluate other rubrics such as storage cost and energy consumption for some specific
deployment environment (e.g. resource-constrained IoT devices). To be specific, I design
a few novel modules to be plugged in to meet different requirements in various situations.
PL1C, PKLC along with their enhancement module PL1C − RF and PKLC − RF
is designed to protect the privacy of image per se and corresponding feature vectors
while enabling accurate and efficient image annotation. PPCL and PPKL is proposed
to efficiently support privacy protection of user image in CNN inference stage with
no accuracy loss. Pluggable integrity check, fast convolution and matrix compression
module are also introduced to further bring fancier features to the scheme and enhance its
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performance in terms of efficiency. With the knowledge that imagery data analysis tasks
could be deployed in cloud/edge environments using either descriptor/deep learning
based approaches, I integrate these modules in cloud-assisted descriptor based image
annotation task and edge-assisted deep learning based image analysis task. Thorough
security analysis is provided to show that my modules are secure in their application
scenarios. Extensive numerical analysis as well as prototype implementation over the
well-known dataset and CNN architectures demonstrate the practical performance of
my design.
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[101] J. Lee, J. Wang, D. Crandall, S. Šabanović, and G. Fox. Real-time, cloud-based
object detection for unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2017 First IEEE International
Conference on Robotic Computing (IRC), pages 36–43, April 2017. doi: 10.1109/
IRC.2017.77.
[102] Airdata UAV. Drone Flight Stats. https://airdata.com/blog/2017/
drone-flight-stats-part-1, 2018. [Online; accessed July-2018].
[103] Shmuel Winograd. Arithmetic complexity of computations, volume 33. Siam, 1980.
[104] Shmuel Winograd. On multiplication of polynomials modulo a polynomial. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 9(2):225–229, 1980.
[105] Lawrence Ibarria, Peter Lindstrom, Jarek Rossignac, and Andrzej Szymczak. Out-
of-core compression and decompression of large n-dimensional scalar fields. In
Computer Graphics Forum, volume 22, pages 343–348. Wiley Online Library, 2003.
Bibliography 127
[106] Michael Schindler. A fast renormalisation for arithmetic coding. In Proceedings
DCC’98 Data Compression Conference (Cat. No. 98TB100225), page 572. IEEE,
1998.
[107] B. P. Rimal, D. P. Van, and M. Maier. Mobile edge computing empowered fiber-
wireless access networks in the 5g era. IEEE Communications Magazine, 55(2):
192–200, February 2017. ISSN 0163-6804. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1600156CM.
[108] Paul, Norbury. Now Trending: SD Memory Cards. https://www.sdcard.org/
press/thoughtleadership/180118_Now_Trending_SD_Memory_Cards.html,
2018. [Online; accessed July-2018].
[109] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-Fei. ImageNet: A Large-
Scale Hierarchical Image Database. In CVPR09, 2009.
[110] Joppe W. Bos, Kristin Lauter, Jake Loftus, and Michael Naehrig. Improved se-
curity for a ring-based fully homomorphic encryption scheme. In Martijn Stam,
editor, Cryptography and Coding, pages 45–64, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg. ISBN 978-3-642-45239-0.
[111] Raspberry Pi Dramble. Power Consumption Benchmarks. http://www.
pidramble.com/wiki/benchmarks/power-consumption, 2018. [Online; accessed
April-2019].
[112] Antonin Guttman. R-trees: A dynamic index structure for spatial searching, vol-
ume 14. ACM, 1984.
[113] Jeffrey Dean and Sanjay Ghemawat. Mapreduce: simplified data processing on
large clusters. Communications of the ACM, 51(1):107–113, 2008.
Bibliography 128
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